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ABSTRACT 
 
Perceptions of Duty and Motivations for Service of American Seagoing Officers During 
the American Revolution. (May 2012) 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James C Bradford 
Benjamin Duerksen, B.A., The Colorado College  
  
This study utilizes correspondence, memoirs, and secondary sources to explore 
the lives and careers of six Continental Navy captains—Esek Hopkins, Joshua Barney, 
John Paul Jones, Hector McNeill, Lambert Wickes, and John Barry—and reveal the 
motivational factors of patriotism, a desire for fame and professional advancement, and 
financial stability which underlay their decisions to seek commissions  in the Continental 
Navy, and influenced their conduct while in the service.  Additionally, it suggests that 
prewar interactions in an "Atlantic World" context influenced the ideological and 
personal motivations that formed the foundations for service in the Continental Navy. 
 All three motivations played a role in each captain's career and affected their 
conduct in relation to their understandings of duty, but the degree to which they 
influenced the captains varied.  Although the promise of a steady income helped 
motivate initial service, financial considerations played a larger role throughout Barney's 
and Barry's careers than they did for other captains.   The desire for fame and personal 
prestige also affected the conduct and service of all six men, though Jones and Hopkins 
provide more concrete examples of its influence.  Finally, experiences interacting with 
iv 
 
West Indies and Atlantic trade networks before the war likely influenced the captains' 
development of revolutionary principles, and their dedication to the United States.  In 
addition to patriotism, Jones professed a devotion to universal principles of liberty and 
rights, and McNeill perceived the Revolution as an attempt to establish God's Kingdom 
of the Just.   
 The degree to which each captain succeeded in achieving his goals, and the affect 
his Continental service had on employment after the Revolution, also varied 
significantly.  Hopkins failed as the navy's commander-in-chief, but his performance did 
not negatively impact his social and political standing in his native Rhode Island.  Unlike 
McNeill, Captains Barry, Barney and Jones also utilized their networks of friends and 
acquaintances well, helping them find prestigious and stable employment in other 
seagoing capacities after the war.  Wickes died in 1777, but his brief service also 
suggests he would have achieved success had he survived.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This study investigates the lives of six Continental Navy captains and reveals the 
complex, sometimes conflicting motivational factors of patriotism, financial stability, 
and a desire for social status and fame which underlay their decisions to seek  
commissions  in the Continental Navy, and influenced their conduct while in the service.  
By examining their interpersonal conflicts and, at times, self-interested motivations, it 
provides characterizations that are more complete than those in many previous works.  
Furthermore, in offering an analysis of a portion of one stratum of the navy, it suggests 
that prewar interactions in an "Atlantic World" context influenced the ideological and 
personal motivations that formed the foundations for service in the Continental Navy. 
Within the last century, military historians have come to emphasize the 
importance of studying ground-level combatants in order to understand how and why 
wars were fought.  In particular, more recent studies on the Continental army and armies 
of the American Civil War argue that the experiences and motivations of soldiers are 
central to tracing social, political, and economic issues which affect the United States to 
this day.  In A Revolutionary People at War, Charles Royster analyzes the non-
materialist motives Continental soldiers had for serving, and the relationship between the  
army and American society.  James McPherson's What They Fought For, 1861-1865, 
 
This thesis follows the Chicago Manual of Style, Sixteenth edition. 
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and Apostles of Disunion by Charles Dew explore similar themes for the Civil War.1 
 Although Jesse Lemisch pioneered this method of study in his essay on 
American sailors during the Revolution, no study of the Continental Navy explores 
sailors’ motivations in any detail.2  Apart from the plethora of biographies on John Paul 
Jones, and to a lesser extent John Barry, and a smattering of other biographies and 
published journals and memoirs of sailors, the voices and experiences of American men 
at sea are mostly absent from the current literature covering the American Revolution 
and Continental Navy.  In focusing their debate on whether or not the Continental Navy 
was significant to the outcome of the Revolution, historians have largely neglected the 
human component of the service.  Just as analyses of the motivations of men in the 
Continental Army or armies of the Civil War add significantly to the understanding of 
those services and conflicts, studies detailing the understandings of duty and motivations 
for service of American sailors during the Revolution stand to enhance historians’ 
knowledge of the war, and the founding and development of the United States and its 
naval services. 
  While an all-encompassing approach examining sailors from all ranks and levels 
of society would benefit the field, the scarce and scattered resources on enlisted 
personnel appear to make this impossible at this time.  Instead, this study takes six 
                                                 
1
 Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-
1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); James McPherson, What They Fought For, 
1861-1865 (New York: Anchor Books, 1995); Charles Dew, Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession 
Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001).  
These works, particularly Dew’s, are more grounded in sociology than military history but present relevant 
information for military historians.   
2
 Jesse Lemisch, "Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen and the Politics of Revolutionary America," 
William and Mary Quarterly Third Series 25:3 (July 1968): 371-407.  
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Continental Navy captains, John Paul Jones, Joshua Barney, Esek Hopkins, John Barry, 
Lambert Wickes, and Hector McNeill and explores, compares, and contrasts their 
possible motivations and understandings of duty.  These captains came from different 
backgrounds, and achieved varied success during their careers in the Continental Navy 
that influenced their lives after the Revolution; Hopkins went into local politics, Jones 
and Barney served in foreign navies, Barney and Barry accepted commissions in the 
U.S. Navy following its establishment in 1794, and McNeill re-entered the merchant 
service.3  Each officer held complex views about duty, and had multiple motives for 
serving. 
 Of the six captains John Paul Jones has received the most attention, although 
many of his early biographies, including Augustus Buell's two-volume contribution, are 
riddled with falsifications.  Jones has likely received the most accurate characterization 
as well, complete with his egotism and desire for status and recognition, alongside his 
professionalism and naval ability.  Such characteristics are most clearly defined in more 
recent books by Peter Vansittart and Frank Walker, and by James C. Bradford's essay on 
Jones in Quarterdeck & Bridge.  Samuel Eliot Morison's 1959 Pulitzer Prize-winning 
biography probes Jones’s motives in greater depth than Lincoln Lorenz's more detailed 
biography of a quarter century earlier.  This study builds on these works to focus more 
closely on Jones’s understanding of duty, and the factors that motivated him to join and 
continue serving in the Continental Navy after suffering significant setbacks.4 
                                                 
3
 Lambert Wickes died during the war.   
4
 Augustus Buell, Paul Jones, Founder of the American Navy: A History, 2 vols. (London: K. Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co., 1900); Peter Vansittart, John Paul Jones: A Restless Spirit (London: Robson 
Books, 2004); Frank Walker, John Paul Jones: Maverick Hero (Gloucestershire, UK: Spellmount, 2007); 
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 John Barry has likewise received considerable biographic attention, although to a 
lesser extent than John Paul Jones.  William Bell Clark, like many biographers of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, stressed Barry's religious motivation rather than 
other aspects of his career.5  Other biographers, e.g., Joseph Gurn, simply misrepresent 
Barry in hagiographic works that advanced Barry's image at the expense of other 
captains, or credit Barry with unique attributes which, in actuality, were not 
exceptional.6  While more recent biographies, e.g., Tim McGrath's, have reassessed 
Barry in a much more accurate light, even deemphasizing Barry's oft-cited unofficial 
title as the "Father of the American Navy," his understanding of duty and reasons for 
serving have not received explicit treatment.7  
 The other four captains focused upon in this study have not been the subjects of 
significant historical inquiry.  Although Hulbert Footner provided a biography of Joshua 
Barney in 1940, Barney was only recently rescued from obscurity by the efforts of Louis 
A. Norton.  Norton does an admirable job of describing Barney's multiple career changes 
in both Captains Contentious and Joshua Barney, but provides only brief commentary 
on some of Barney's possible motivations, as well as his “self-imposed code of ethics.”  
Although this essay reaches different conclusions regarding some of Barney's choices, 
                                                                                                                                                
James C. Bradford, "John Paul Jones: Honor and Professionalism," in Quarterdeck & Bridge, ed. James C. 
Bradford, 15-39 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997); Samuel E. Morison, John Paul Jones: A 
Sailor's Biography (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1959); Lincoln Lorenz, John Paul Jones: 
Fighter for Freedom and Glory (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1943). 
5
 William B. Clark, Gallant John Barry, 1745-1803: The Story of a Naval Hero of Two Wars (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1938), vii. 
6
 Joseph Gurn, Commodore John Barry: Father of the American Navy (New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 
1933), is especially critical of John Paul Jones in relation to Barry, p.55.  For an example of a non-unique 
attribute presented as such, see Gurn's commentary on Barry's modesty in writing after-action reports, 
p.24.  Although more concise than, say, those by John Paul Jones, Barry's official reports were no different 
than many other captains of the period.  
7
 Tim McGrath, John Barry: An American Hero in the Age of Sail (Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2010). 
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Norton's inquiries provide solid ground from which to expand upon Barney's 
understanding of duty and motivations for serving in the Continental, American, and 
French navies, as well as in private service.8 
 The death of Lambert Wickes early in the war and the paucity of sources explain 
the limited attention paid to him.  Although included in more general works on the 
Continental Navy and its captains, the only book-length biography of Wickes was 
published in 1932.  William Bell Clark's book contributes to the historiography by 
describing little-known facets of Wickes’s career, but only briefly mentions Wickes's 
understanding of duty and leaves wholly unexplored Wickes's motivations for service.9 
 Hector McNeill and Esek Hopkins have received even less attention from 
historians than Lambert Wickes.  Like Wickes, they are included in more general studies 
of Continental Navy captains, including William James Morgan's Captains to the 
Northward, and John A. McManemin's Captains of the Continental Navy, but neither is 
the focus of a book-length study.  While works that include Esek Hopkins often describe 
his provincialism, they do not connect it to his motivation to serve, or pose other 
possible motives.  Scholars have also largely ignored Hector McNeill, his character, and 
his motivations, a deficiency this essay corrects as the documents published by Gardner 
Weld Allen in 1921, although brief, provide significant material relating to McNeill's 
                                                 
8
 Hulbert Footner, Sailor of Fortune: The Life and Adventures of Commodore Barney, USN. 1940. Reprint 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998); Louis A. Norton, Captains Contentious: The Dysfunctional 
Sons of the Brine (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2009); Louis A. Norton, Joshua Barney: 
Hero of the Revolution and 1812 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000).  
9
 William B. Clark, Lambert Wickes, Sea Raider and Diplomat: The Story of a Naval Captain of the 
Revolution (New haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1932).  
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motivations for service and understanding of duty.10  McNeill's overtly religious 
conception of the Revolution, though not exclusive to him, is particularly unique from 
other captains and deserves further inquiry.          
  Whereas many more recent studies on the Revolution ignore, or at the very least 
reduce, the role of patriotism in the founding generation’s motivations, this essay argues 
that patriotism deserves a very important place among the motivations for service in the 
Continental Navy.  However, the patriotism displayed by the six captains is 
problematized in three important ways.  Firstly, Jones, McNeill and Barry were foreign-
born, leaving room to question whether they actually formed a dedicated attachment to 
the rebelling colonies during their time on the North American continent.  Secondly, 
although provincialism existed in the North American colonies, the men who committed 
themselves to an independent United States did so to an idea, rather than to an 
established country.  Finally, although the period around the turn of the nineteenth 
century is recognized as an Age of Revolution, the British West Indies did not follow the 
American mainland in revolt.  These points suggest that the prewar experiences of the 
six Continental captains included elements that helped them develop principles which set 
them apart from people in other parts of the British Atlantic. 
Considering the captains and their patriotism in an Atlantic World context helps 
reconcile the aforementioned complexities.  In Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea 
and The Many-Headed Hydra, Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh argue that 
                                                 
10
 William James Morgan, Captains to the Northward: The New England Captains in the Continental 
Navy (Barre, MA: Barre Gazette, 1959); John A. McManemin, Captains of the Continental Navy (Ho-Ho-
Kus, NJ: Ho-Ho-Kus Publishing Co., 1981); Gardner W. Allen, Captain Hector McNeill of the 
Continental Navy. 1922. Reprint (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2009).  
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shipboard experience in the Atlantic World helped foster the ideas of liberty and 
individualism that prompted resistance to authority and colonial rebellion. The waterside 
communities that developed in Atlantic trade centers further served as areas of exchange 
and interaction amongst seamen and with counterparts on land, and promulgated 
universal principles of liberty.11  Having participated in merchant activities in the West 
Indies before the war, the six captains would have conducted business and social affairs 
within those communities of exchange.  
While Rediker and Linebaugh's conception of the Atlantic as a network for ideas 
may help explain why each captain developed revolutionary values, it does not explain 
why Hopkins, Jones, Barney, Barry, McNeill, Wickes, and other mariners took up arms 
against the British in support of an independent United States.  To that end it is useful to 
consider why other British colonies in the West Indies did not display a latent desire to 
rebel.  In An Empire Divided, Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy convincingly argues that many 
British inhabitants of the West Indies did not consider the islands their home; 
absenteeism was the rule of the day, and the West Indies colonies maintained strong 
social, cultural, and economic ties to Britain throughout the period.12  By choosing to 
make their homes in the North American colonies, each of the six captains established a 
stronger connection to the continent than to Britain itself, and in the cases of Jones, 
Barry, and McNeill, the captains born in Scotland and Ireland, their connections to 
                                                 
11
 Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-
American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Peter Linebaugh 
and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of 
the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000).  
12
 Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean 
(Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2000), 3, 58.  
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Britain were probably already strained.  As a result, the ideas of liberty they encountered 
during their careers in the commercial world of the North Atlantic before the Revolution 
may have served as the foundations for their dedication to the idea of independence, and 
enabled their devotion to a not-yet-formed United States.13 
The captains also possessed other motivations that were far less idealistic than 
universal notions of rights and freedom.  Chief among these additional reasons for 
service was the advancement of personal image and fulfillment of individual pride.  
Public image was extraordinarily important in the advancement of one’s personal and 
familial station in life, and military service was one of the few ways available to non-
landed individuals to move up the social ladder.  Successful ventures also created 
networks of personal and business contacts which created investment opportunities in 
trade, and provided introductions which could open doors for oneself or one's family.  
This was particularly true for many Continental captains, and the American, West Indies 
and French contacts they made before the Revolution and during their service in the 
navy provided additional opportunities for employment in private service and in foreign 
militaries. 
Closely linked to one's public standing was an individual's sense of personal 
pride, a hugely influential factor not only in fighting for the Continental Navy.  This 
same sense of pride influenced how each captain understood his duties and conducted 
himself while in service.  Ever mindful of how others might assess their performance 
                                                 
13
 The author's conception of patriotism is also heavily influenced by Douglas Adair, "Fame and the 
Founding Fathers," in Fame and the Founding Fathers, ed. Trevor Colbourn, 3-36. 1974. Reprint 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998).   
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and demeanor, the captains made decisions meant to bring personal fame while also 
buttressing each man’s perception of his own character.   
 Financial stability also played a part in motivating service and conduct.  Whether 
supporting their families in America, supporting themselves overseas, or in some 
situations providing for their ships and crews on the promise that Congress would 
reimburse the expenses paid, financial considerations were extremely important to 
Continental captains. While some were able to stay in the Continental Navy and support 
themselves throughout the Revolution, financial difficulties and the imbalance between 
the number of vessels and officers in the Continental Navy left some without ships to 
command, thereby forcing them to utilize their Atlantic World contacts to make multiple 
changes in employment over the course of the war and afterwards. 
 Importantly, it must be noted that none of the three main influences—dedication 
to a cause, personal image and pride, and financial stability—were ever at work alone.  It 
is essential to understand that there was constant balancing at play among these 
motivational factors within all six captains, but that some influences were more 
important to certain captains than to others.  Motives were further complicated by how 
each understood his duty as a gentleman, and as a naval officer. 
 Organized thematically to promote comparison, this study considers each of the 
influences or motivations in separate chapters.  The first introduces the topic by 
describing its antecedents and objectives.  Chapter two provides a biographical snapshot 
of each man to help orient subsequent discussions of events within the overall context of 
their lives.  Chapter three begins the analysis by discussing how the captains understood 
10 
 
their duty, and where they located their place within the naval community.  Each 
motivation then gets its own chapter starting with pride, fame, and professional 
advancement, followed by chapters on patriotism and financial motivations.  The 
chapters on fame and patriotism include additional discussions of what the captains' 
opinions of privateers suggest about their motivations. Lastly, the concluding section 
offers final commentary on the main points of each chapter, and traces the naval service 
of each officer following the Revolutionary War.
11 
 
CHAPTER II 
YOUNG MEN AND THE SEA: THE LIVES AND CAREERS OF SIX 
CONTINENTAL CAPTAINS 
 
The six captains examined in this study came from varying familial backgrounds 
and widely separated geographic regions.  Each went to sea young, and their experiences 
prior to entering the Continental Navy influenced their decisions to join the service, and 
contributed to their understandings of professionalism and duty.  Their actions and 
command temperament reflected their backgrounds and motivations for service, and help 
to account for the widely divergent career arcs they experienced.   The following chapter 
provides broad context for subsequent discussions, focusing mainly on the important 
events in each man's life that are examined in later chapters, or that demonstrate 
connections to Atlantic World social, political, and economic networks.   
 
 
Esek Hopkins 
 
 Born into a prominent, Quaker Rhode Island family on April 26, 1718, Esek 
Hopkins followed a number of his brothers to sea shortly after the death of their father in 
1738.  Within three years the young mariner became master of the merchant ship 
Wentworth, and subsequently commanded other vessels owned by prominent Providence 
merchants, plying the West Indies trade while establishing a large family at home.  
12 
 
Hopkins shifted to privateering during the French and Indian War, becoming one of 
Britain's more successful privateers, then returned to merchant work for a brief period 
until his election to the colonial assembly from North Providence in 1768.  His 
reelection in 1771 and the press of public obligations led Hopkins to leave service at sea 
and become a merchant on land.1  
 Appointed a brigadier general in October 1775, Hopkins served as the 
commander-in-chief of all the Rhode Island military forces before receiving a call to 
Philadelphia from his brother, Stephen Hopkins, a Rhode Island delegate to the Second 
Continental Congress.  In December the elder Hopkins, a leading member of the Naval 
Committee, arranged for Esek's appointment as the senior officer in the new Continental 
Navy, and as the commander of its squadron.2  Hopkins took the largest of the eight 
vessels initially obtained for the navy, Alfred, 24, as his flagship, and dropped down the 
Delaware River in mid-January 1776 after receiving orders earlier in the month to 
protect the coasts of Virginia and North and South Carolina, and to then turn northward 
to Rhode Island.   Hopkins’s orders gave him leeway to "distress the enemy by all means 
in your power” if he encountered severe weather or an unforeseen disaster.3   
When the squadron put to sea on February 17, 1776, Hopkins ordered it to sail 
south, bypassing Chesapeake Bay and the Southern coast, and to proceed to New 
Providence in the Bahamas Islands where Hopkins knew a large amount of powder and 
                                                 
1
 William J. Morgan, Captains to the Northward, 22; John A. McManemin, Captains, 153. 
2
 Journal of the Continental Congress, 22 December 1775, in William B. Clark, Michael J. Crawford, and 
William J. Morgan, ed., Naval Documents of the American Revolution, 11 vols. to date (Washington: 
Naval History Division, Dept. of the Navy, 1964- ), 3: 207-08. Hereafter NDAR.  For Stephen Hopkins’s 
letter to Esek offering him the position, see Stephen Hopkins to Esek Hopkins, 6 November 1775, in 
NDAR, 2: 907-08. 
3
 Naval Committee to Commodore Esek Hopkins, 5 January 1776, in NDAR, 3:637-38.  
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munitions were being stored.  Hopkins and his squadron arrived off Nassau on March 1, 
but did not attack the forts defending the city until the following day.  This delay 
afforded Governor Montfort Browne time to move the vast majority of the powder 
across the island, load it onto a sloop, and save it from capture.  Even with the powder 
gone, Hopkins seized a variety of other munitions including 71 cannon, which took two 
weeks to load onto the American ships.4            
During the return voyage to New England, Hopkins's squadron managed to take 
two small ships, the brig Boston and schooner Hawk, but was roughly handled in an 
engagement with an inferior British warship, the twenty-gun Glasgow, as it cruised off 
Block Island on April 6.  Although outgunned and outnumbered, Captain Tyringham 
Howe and Glasgow managed to damage a number of the American ships before 
breaking off the engagement and outrunning his American pursuers.  While the failure to 
capture Glasgow was perhaps understandable given the green nature of Hopkins's 
squadron, combined with some ineptitude on Hopkins's part, the incident nevertheless 
became a point of contention for the incompetence or cowardice displayed by certain 
captains during the battle, and it reflected poorly on Hopkins's leadership.5   
Recruitment problems and desertions plagued Hopkins's squadron once it put 
into Providence, Rhode Island, and it would never again sail as a unit under Hopkins or 
                                                 
4
 For an inventory of the items taken from Nassau, see Esek Hopkins to Governor Jonathan Trumbull, 
Enclosure, 8 April 1776, in NDAR, 4: 711. For additional details, see McManemin, Captains, 166, and 
William M. Fowler Jr., "Esek Hopkins: Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Navy," in Quarterdeck & 
Bridge: Two Centuries of American Naval Leaders, ed. James C. Bradford, 3-14 (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1997), 7-8.   
5
 For Hopkins's explanation of the encounter, see Esek Hopkins to John Hancock, 9 April 1776, in NDAR, 
4: 735-36.  For Howe’s account, see Journal of the H.M.S. Glasgow, Captain Tyringham Howe, 5-6 April 
1776, in NDAR, 4: 680.  Also see Fowler Jr., "Esek Hopkins," 11.   
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any other officer.  Congress called on Hopkins on June 14, 1776, to respond to 
complaints against him, and to explain the Continental Navy's inactivity.6  Congressional 
members were unconvinced by Hopkins’s arguments and voted to censure him, though 
they allowed Hopkins to return to Rhode Island to retake command of his squadron.   
Although Hopkins tried to get his ships to sea, even asking the General Assembly 
in Rhode Island to declare an embargo on local shipping until the Continental ships 
could find crews, his efforts were undermined by his vocal disdain for Congress and its 
authority.  Hopkins's inability to capture the British frigate Diamond as the enemy ship 
sat aground during a minor engagement on January 2, 1777, also resulted in 
embarrassment.7  His poor performance and his quarrels with members of Congress 
resulted in his suspension from the navy on March 26, 1777, and his formal dismissal 
from service on January 2, 1778.8   
Hopkins nevertheless remained an important figure in Rhode Island, whose 
voters elected him to the General Assembly from 1777 through 1786.  He also served on 
the state council of war and other local committees, and as a trustee of Rhode Island 
College after 1783.  The first and only commander-in-chief of the Continental Navy, 
Esek Hopkins died on February 26, 1802, after years of ill health at the age of 84.9 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 John Hancock to Esek Hopkins, 14 June 1776, in NDAR, 5: 528. 
7
 Esek Hopkins to William Ellery, 13 March 1777, in NDAR, 8: 98-99.  
8
 Hopkins's suspension from Journal of the Continental Congress, 26 March 1777, in NDAR, 8: 206.  
Dismissal in Journal of the Continental Congress, 2 January 1778, in NDAR, 11: 20.  
9
 Fowler Jr., "Esek Hopkins," 12; McManemin, Captains, 183. 
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Joshua Barney       
 
Joshua Barney was born outside Baltimore to William and Frances Barney on 
July 6, 1759.  Although wealthy due to family fortunes on both sides, his Catholic family 
lacked connections in high society.  After attending common school until he was ten, 
Barney served an apprenticeship with a dry goods retailer in Baltimore, then worked at a 
counting house in Alexandria, Virginia.10  Soon afterwards in 1771, he enlisted on a 
Baltimore pilot boat and began his career as a sailor.  A year later Barney entered into an 
apprenticeship under his brother-in-law, Captain Thomas Drysdale, and showed such 
promise that Drysdale named him second mate on the Sidney in 1774.  
Drysdale's death mid-voyage in 1775 unexpectedly hurtled young Barney into 
command of the Sidney, over which he had no legal authority.  The deceased captain's 
tyrannical treatment of his crew and Barney, along with Barney's successful completion 
of the voyage in a leadership position he did not expect, had lasting effects on his 
understanding of duty and professionalism.11  During its return trip to Baltimore, an 
officer from the British sloop-of-war Kingfisher boarded the Sidney and informed 
Barney that the colonies had entered into a state of rebellion: an announcement which he 
                                                 
10
 The dry goods retailer closed his business soon after Barney arrived. Mary Barney, ed., A Biographical 
Memoir of the Late Commodore Joshua Barney (Boston: Gray and Bowen, Press of I.R. Butts, 1832),   
http://galenet.galegroup.com.lib-
ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/servlet/Sabin?af=RN&ae=CY106418237&srchtp=a&ste=14, 
4.  Mary Barney, Joshua's niece, published this edited version of Joshua's memoir.  Care has been taken to 
use sections in the biography that are directly quoted from Joshua Barney's original, and to alert the reader 
when the quote is Mary Barney's flourish.    
11
 Joshua Barney described Drysdale's treatment as "very severe and brutal."  See Joshua Barney as quoted 
in Barney, A Biographical Memoir, 10-11. 
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"devoured … with a greedy ear."12  After reaching Baltimore, Barney settled his account 
with John Smith, owner of the Sidney, briefly visited his family, and then signed with the 
Continental Navy as master's mate on board the sloop Hornet, commanded by Captain 
William Stone.13  Stone's unwillingness to engage an inferior British tender from the 
frigate Roebuck prompted Barney to transfer to the schooner, Wasp, under Captain 
Charles Alexander.  Barney's role in the successful evasion of the British frigates 
Roebuck and Liverpool, and the capture of the British brig, Betsy, earned him a 
lieutenant's commission in the Continental Navy. 
 Barney moved between positions on ships in the Continental Navy and private 
service for the rest of the war, including service aboard the Continental Navy brig, 
Andrea Doria.14  Captured by the British three times, Barney often received respectful 
and preferential treatment from his captors in comparison to the common treatment 
usually meted out to prisoners held on board notorious British prison hulks.  After one 
such imprisonment, following the capture of Saratoga and Barney's escape from an 
English prison, he captured General Monk, which, according to James Fenimore Cooper, 
"has been justly deemed one of the most brilliant [captures] that ever occurred under the 
American Flag."15      
Barney found few prospects for assignment in the Continental Navy upon his 
return to America in 1782, so accepted the command of the 100-ton converted 
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merchantman Hyder-Ally, in the Pennsylvania State Navy.16  After overseeing its 
conversion to a warship, Barney was tasked on April 7, 1782, with escorting a party of 
seven merchant vessels to the mouth of Delaware Bay.  When spotted by British 
blockading ships, the sloop-of-war General Monk and 32-gun frigate Quebec, Barney 
directed his helmsman to obey the opposite of his orders yelled within earshot of 
General Monk.  The ruse worked; Barney and his crew soon captured General Monk 
with a loss of only four men dead and eleven wounded.  Effecting an escape from 
Quebec, Hyder-Ally and its prize docked in Philadelphia where they were greeted with a 
thirteen-gun salute.17 
 For a time after the war Barney dedicated himself to pursuits ashore.  He initially 
invested in a business venture that quickly faltered, and afterwards turned to local 
politics.  His involvement in politics garnered him social and political friends, including 
members of George Washington's family, but also rankled Barney's future political 
opponents who later used his service in the French Navy to foil his own attempts at 
elected office.  More immediately, however, his connections netted him offers of 
multiple government positions.  Quickly tiring of those positions and "[fancying] that his 
health was very much impaired by his long residence ashore," Barney convinced his 
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business partner to purchase a small brig which he used for trading goods and slaves in 
South America.18 
When offered a commission in the U.S. Navy in 1794, Barney rejected it in a 
dispute over his seniority, and subsequently joined the French Navy in 1795 as a 
capitaine de vaisseau in defense of the new French Republic.19 Eventually reaching the 
rank of capitaine de vaisseau de premier, the equivalent of commodore in the American 
service, and given a commission as chef de division des armies navales, Barney 
participated in events surrounding Saint Domingue and the Haitian Revolution.  Allowed 
to resign his commission in 1802, Barney returned to the United States and made 
unsuccessful bids for Congress in 1806 and 1810.  The outbreak of the War of 1812 
presented him with an opportunity to return to naval service, which he did as a captain in 
the U.S. Navy on April 26, 1814.  His command of the Patuxent Flotilla, and his 
contributions at Bladensburg and to the successful defense of Fort McHenry in 
Baltimore Harbor later that year, marked the end of a career characterized by numerous 
changes in direction, involving both personal achievements and disappointments 
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John Paul Jones 
 
 John Paul, the man remembered today as John Paul Jones, was born the son of a 
gardener and house maid in Arbigland, Scotland, on July 6, 1747.  At the age of thirteen, 
after receipt of a rudimentary education at the Church of Scotland's Kirkbean Parish 
school, Jones apprenticed on board the Friendship, a brig out of Whitehaven, England, 
which sailed between Scotland, the West Indies, and Chesapeake Bay.20  During 
layovers in Fredericksburg, Virginia, Jones often stayed with his older brother, William, 
who may have helped foster Jones’s colonial sympathies. 
 Financial difficulties in 1764 forced the sale of the Friendship, and released 
Jones from his apprenticeship.  He worked in the slave trade for the next two years, 
serving first on the King George of Whitehaven before accepting a position as first mate 
on the brigantine Two Friends of Kingston, Jamaica, in 1766.  His reservations about 
human trafficking led Jones to abandon the slave trade in 1768, and seek passage home 
on board the brig John of Liverpool. 
 Jones, like Barney, was first thrust into a position of authority on his voyage 
home when both the captain and mate died of fever, and Jones, the only one aboard who 
knew how to navigate, brought the ship into port.  Although Jones was twenty-one, 
whereas Barney was sixteen, it must nevertheless have been a harrowing experience.  
Impressed by his feat, the owner, Currie, Beck, & Co., gave command of its ship to 
Jones, and after two successful voyages to the West Indies provided him with a 
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recommendation which stated that “he approved himself every way qualified both as a 
navigator and supercargo.” This earned him command of the Betsy in 1772, and Jones 
made a significant amount of money during the next year trading between Tobago, 
Madeira, Ireland, and England.21  
 If these early voyages highlighted Jones’s potential as a great seaman, they also 
exposed his somewhat abrasive character and provoked the earliest of many accusations 
of mistreatment by those who sailed under him.  The first incident occurred while 
commanding the John.  The ship’s carpenter, Mungo Maxwell, claimed Jones had 
flogged him nearly to death. Although James Simpson, a judge of the vice admiralty 
court in Tobago, dismissed Maxwell’s accusations as “frivolous” after inspecting his 
wounds, Maxwell’s father Robert attributed his son’s death later that year to Jones, 
rather than to the fever Mungo caught on a subsequent ship.22  Charges were again 
brought against Jones, and again dismissed, but the rumor that he had flogged a man to 
death was not so easily escaped.   
 The second incident occurred during the Betsy’s last voyage when Jones refused 
to advance wages to his seamen after reaching Tobago.  Instead, he used the funds he 
had to buy more cargo for the return trip.  His proposition to pay the sailors after 
reaching Britain did not sit well with the crew, however, as they were without money to 
enjoy themselves in Tobago after a long Atlantic voyage; Jones faced a mutiny.  When a 
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crewmember cornered Jones against a hatch to the hold and tried to bludgeon him, Jones 
ran the offender through with his sword in self defense.23   
 Jones’s movements during the years following the Tobago incident are hard to 
track, not least of all because of multiple name changes which occurred between 1773 
and 1775; the first to John Jones, and finally to John Paul Jones.24  What is certain is that 
by 1775 he had made his way to Philadelphia where he obtained a commission in the 
Continental Navy.  Thanks to Joseph Hewes, a congressman from North Carolina, Jones 
received an appointment as the senior lieutenant in the new service, and helped in fitting 
the Continental Navy ship Alfred.25 
 Almost exactly a month after he received his commission, Alfred and seven other 
ships sailed for the Bahamas where Jones helped to capture Nassau. En route back to 
America the squadron met HMS Glasgow, which though of inferior power laid bare the 
inexperience and disorganization of the officers and crewmen of the American ships.  In 
the shakeup of officers that followed, Jones was offered and accepted command of the 
sloop Providence, an opportunity he had turned down previously. In his first 
independent cruise, Jones captured or sank seven brigs, a sloop, six schooners, and two 
more ships of unknown rig or size, and upon his return Congress rewarded him with 
promotion to command of Alfred.   
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Despite his record, the Marine Committee delivered a blow to Jones’s ego in the 
seniority list for captains accepted on October 10, 1776.  Likely due to his lack of New 
England political connections and his previous refusal to command Providence, the 
committee placed him eighteenth on the list.26  Jones accepted the captain’s commission 
offered to him on October 10, and cruised off of Nova Scotia in October and November, 
capturing a number of prizes including the Mellish, a 350-ton armed transport carrying 
winter clothing to British troops in Quebec.27 
Promoted again, Jones received command of the twenty-gun, 318-ton sloop-of-
war Ranger on June 18, 1777.  At the end of the year he sailed to France to take 
command of the forty-gun L’Indien, then under construction in Holland.28  Nothing ever 
came of the offer to command the large frigate, however, and tired of inactivity Jones 
sought orders from the American Commissioners in Paris which would allow him 
latitude in operating from France. He received such orders in early January 1778, 
allowing him to "proceed with [Ranger] in the manner you shall judge best, for 
distressing the Enemies of the United States, by sea, or otherwise…."29   Jones used his 
knowledge of the area around the Irish Sea to raid Whitehaven, England, and to capture 
HMS Drake off Ireland in April.  Although the cruise gained him the attention of British 
newspapers, and had a great psychological effect on the British population, any 
exuberance Jones may have experienced over his promising start in Europe was soon 
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diminished by a quarrel with one of his lieutenants, Thomas Simpson, which lost him the 
command of Ranger. 
Feeling dejected and dishonored, Jones went without a ship until December of 
1778 when the French Minister of Marine arranged the purchase of an old 900-ton 
French East Indiaman, the Duc de Duras, for Jones to command.30  Although the ship 
that had been built in 1766 was “found too old for necessary alterations, and fit only for 
extemporary service,” Jones renamed it Bon Homme Richard and prepared his squadron 
of American and French ships, including the frigate Alliance commanded by Pierre 
Landais, to cruise the North Sea in the hopes of taking the large Baltic convoy later in 
the season.31  
 Although Jones failed to capture the entire Baltic convoy, his cruise was 
nevertheless successful and ended in the capture of HMS Serapis in the Battle of 
Flamborough Head on September 23, 1779.  In an effort to save the convoy under his 
protection, Richard Pearson, captain of Serapis, placed his ship in between the Bon 
Homme Richard and the convoy.  The two ships engaged each other almost 
simultaneously, with Jones trying to board the English ship, and Pearson attempting to 
maintain distance and sink Bon Homme Richard with cannon fire.  Towards the end of 
the battle Captain Pierre Landais of Alliance, an officer who had shown extreme 
insubordination since the cruise began, steered his ship into the fray, and fired into Bon 
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Homme Richard multiple times.32  At one point in the battle Pearson is said to have 
yelled across to Jones asking if his ship had struck, to which Jones is attributed the 
immortal reply, “I have not yet begun to fight.”33  The action lasted over three hours at 
extremely close range, with both ships taking horrific amounts of damage and over 400 
sailors killed or wounded between them.  Serapis eventually struck, but the damage to 
Bon Homme Richard was so severe that it sank on the way to Texel.34           
 The well-fought action against Serapis, the pinnacle of Jones’s career, gave the 
Continental Navy a much-needed victory during a year of overwhelming losses.  Jones 
commanded other ships until the end of the war, including the only line-of-battle ship in 
the Continental Navy, America, before it was gifted to the French, but the majority of his 
time was spent on shore in Europe visiting the king's court, petitioning for prize money 
owed him and his crew, or in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, fitting out America.  Like 
Barney, he failed in business ventures after the war and personal restlessness combined 
with financial strain caused by unpaid prize money necessitated employment.35   
Jones wrote a memoir of his service for Louis XVI in a non-subtle bid for 
position as a flag officer in the French Navy, but instead accepted a position as a rear 
admiral in the Russian Navy in command of the Black Sea squadron.36  He received the 
Order of Saint Anne for his part in the Battle of Liman, but was ousted from the Navy in 
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October 1788, after coming into conflict with the Prince Charles De Nassau Siegen and 
Prince Potemkin. Accused of raping a ten year old in 1789, Jones left Russia and 
eventually moved to Paris in 1790.37  There he led a “meager social life” for the next two 
years—Paris had changed and was no longer the Paris Jones loved and left behind in the 
1780s—and his attempts to regain favor in Russia by offering Catherine military plans 
were ignored.38  Although Jones received an appointment as the American Consul in 
Algeria on July 18, 1792, he died before receiving the news.   
 
 
Hector McNeill 
 
 Born to a Protestant family in Northern Ireland on October 10, 1728, Hector 
McNeill moved to Boston in 1737 with parents.  He went to sea young, and becoming a 
ship's master in his early twenties before leasing his schooner to the British for use as a 
troop transport during the French and Indian War.  McNeill was taken prisoner in 1755 
by Indian allies of the French, and after being exchanged he returned to merchant 
activities for a decade until the outbreak of the Revolution, when he joined the force 
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commanded by General Benedict Arnold that invaded Canada in 1775, and retreated to 
New York the following spring.39 
 Connections with John Hancock and Thomas Cushing, along with his military 
service with Arnold, likely accounted for McNeill's appointment as captain of the new 
Continental frigate Boston on June 15, 1776.  The New England provincialism that 
dominated Congress probably also influenced McNeill's placement of third on the 
October 10, 1776, seniority list for Continental captains, with only James Nicholson and 
John Manley as his seniors.40   
Like most Continental ships, Boston suffered delays in putting to sea due to 
cannon and crew shortages.  When McNeill finally sailed in May 1777, he did so 
alongside John Manley who commanded Hancock.  Manley and McNeill shared an 
uneasy relationship, but did succeed in capturing the British frigate Fox in June.  Buoyed 
by their success, the small squadron stayed at sea in an effort to capture additional 
British ships.   
The decision to continue cruising instead of returning to port with their prize 
proved costly.  When the American ships confronted a British squadron composed of the 
frigates Rainbow and Flora and the brig Victor, Manley mistook Rainbow for a ship-of-
the-line and the three American vessels struck out in different directions to avoid 
engagement.  Flora pursued and captured Fox, and Rainbow overtook Hancock after a 
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39 hour pursuit.  McNeill was able to reach the Sheepscott River, and sneaked out of the 
inlet on August 1 to continue home.  In doing so he saved one of the Continental Navy's 
new frigates, but his actions during the engagement were heavily criticized by 
congressional members and the public upon his return to Boston.41 
  Accused of abandoning his superior officer when confronted by the enemy, and 
suffering from problems with his own officers, McNeill's reputation was severely 
damaged after the cruise with Hancock.  As a result, the Eastern Navy Board suspended 
him on November 12, 1777, and gave command of Boston to Samuel Tucker.  The same 
court martial in June 1778 that exonerated Manley for the loss of Hancock also 
dismissed McNeill from service.42 
 Although absolved of official blame for Hancock's capture on January 15, 1779, 
McNeill did not receive another Continental command.  In the absence of an official 
appointment he accepted command of the privateer Pallas in 1780, and became the 
primary owner and commander of Adventure in November of the same year.  McNeill 
returned to merchant ventures after the war, though he met with little success before his 
death on Christmas Eve, 1785.43  
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Lambert Wickes 
 
Very little is known about Lambert Wickes's life before he received an 
appointment in the Continental Navy.  He was born around 1742 to a distinguished 
Maryland family that traced its roots to Major Joseph Wickes, one of the earliest settlers 
on the Eastern Shore.  Like many young men who grew up on the coast, Lambert 
Wickes joined the merchant marine in Philadelphia, and as early as 1774 he entered into 
a trading partnership with James Ringgold.  Men involved in the merchant community 
also knew Wickes as an early supporter of American independence, the most important 
of whom was Robert Morris, the Continental Congress's future Agent of the Marine and 
Superintendent of Finance. Appointed a captain in the Continental Navy in the spring of 
1776, Wickes took command of the 18-gun brig Reprisal.44  
 On June 16, 1776, Congress ordered Wickes to take William Bingham to the 
French island of Martinique in the West Indies.45  Bingham's mission included the 
purchase of munitions for the Continental Army and delivery of a letter to the governor 
meant to assess French support for America.46  En route, Wickes was to protect a group 
of merchant vessels as they attempted to evade the British blockade of Delaware Bay.47  
On June 28, Wickes in Reprisal, John Barry in Lexington, and several merchant ships 
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weighed anchor, meeting the brig Nancy inbound from the West Indies as the 
Continental ships sailed southward.  With six British pursuers closing in on the brig, its 
captain purposely ran his ship aground in an attempt to save its cargo from capture.  
Determined to assist in salvaging what they could, Captains Wickes and Barry sent men 
to the floundering vessel who offloaded a portion of Nancy's cargo, including 62 
firelocks, 260 barrels of powder, and some dried goods, before setting a charge which 
destroyed the ship and killed upwards of 30 British sailors when they tried to board.  The 
avoidance of total loss was bittersweet for Wickes, however, as a cannonball killed his 
brother Richard Wickes in the last minutes of the engagement.48 
Wickes finally left Delaware Bay on July 3, managing to capture two British 
merchant ships, the Peter and the Friendship, on his way to Martinique. Once arrived, he  
caused Captain John Chapman of the British sloop Shark some anxiety over neutral port 
laws after Wickes evaded pursuit by entering the harbor under the protection of French 
coastal guns.  Wickes's completion of his mission both provided an important service to 
the United States by delivering Bingham safely, and proved himself a competent fighting 
captain, leading Congress to entrust him with transporting Benjamin Franklin to Nantes, 
France, to serve as an American Commissioner in Europe.  Since "Wickes [had] already 
done honor in Action to the American Flagg," he received further orders to cruise for 
enemy vessels as the first Continental Navy ship in European waters.49 
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 Wickes undertook multiple successful cruises in Europe, including one to the 
Irish Sea in the middle of June 1777, accompanied by the American ships Lexington and 
Dolphin, that resulted in the capture or sinking of eighteen ships in three days.50  
Following his initial operations, he refitted in French ports where he sold his prizes and 
their cargos through local merchants—he received especially amicable treatment in St. 
Malo—but reports of his activities and French complicity in his dealings soon spurred 
the British into action.  Amid the difficulties and growing tensions between the French 
and British over his presence, Wickes wrote to the American Commissioners in late 
February expressing his desire to return to America:  "As there is So many Difficulties 
Attending our Cruizing on the Coast of Europe I hope you Think it Best to order me 
Home as Soon As possible….  I have had much trouble hear but Am in hopes it is Now 
At an End."51   
In early September, Wickes received the orders he sought and sailed for 
America.52  Unfortunately, Reprisal never made it to the United States as it foundered 
off the coast of Newfoundland, taking the entire crew save the ship’s cook to their 
deaths.  The loss of Captain Wickes deprived the Continental Navy of an experienced 
mariner, and in the words of Benjamin Franklin, "a gallant Officer and a very worthy 
man" whose death was "extreamly [sic] to be lamented."53 
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John Barry 
  
 The third foreign-born captain, John Barry, grew up on the coast of Wexford 
County, Ireland, after his birth in 1745.  Raised as a Roman Catholic, he attended a 
government charter school until the age of nine when he became a cabin boy on his 
uncle's merchant ship.  At fifteen years old, Barry made his way to Philadelphia and 
spent the next six years plying the West Indies trade.  He took command of Edward 
Denny's 60-ton schooner, the Barbadoes, in 1766, and made nine round trips to 
Barbados trading North American foodstuffs for West Indian sugar.54 
 Barry spent the remaining years leading up to the American Revolution 
commanding various other merchant vessels, and as early as 1769 became a member of 
the Society for the Relief of Poor and Distressed Masters of Ships.55  At the outset of the 
Revolution, Barry commanded the 200-ton Black Prince, owned by Willing, Morris & 
Co., and oversaw its conversion to a warship when the Continental Congress purchased 
the ship and renamed it Alfred.56  Six months later, on March 14, 1776, he received 
command of Lexington, a 16-gun brig, and orders to cruise from Sandy Hook to the 
Capes of Virginia.  While putting to sea he avoided an encounter with the British frigate 
                                                 
54
 McGrath, John Barry, 19-21. 
55
 Joseph Gurn, Commodore John Barry, 4.  The Society had both fraternal and charitable purposes, and 
was instrumental in maintaining the 7 £ wage paid to merchant captains in Philadelphia during the Seven 
Years' War.  See Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the 
Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press, 1979), 208. 
56
 Robert Morris owned the largest share of the company. McManemin, Captains, 21.   
32 
 
Roebuck in the Delaware River, and on April 7 engaged Edward, a sloop tender of HMS 
Liverpool.  The battle lasted two hours before Barry succeeded in taking Edward.57      
 When Congress authorized construction of thirteen new frigates, Barry received 
command of Effingham.  Unable to procure cannon to arm the vessel, he spent the next 
year defending the Delaware River as a barge captain, and took part in the sinking of 
Nancy with Captain Wickes.58  On July 4, 1778, Captain Thomas Thompson's 
suspension resulted in Barry's appointment as captain of Raleigh, 32.  The command did 
not last long, however, as the British ships Experiment, 50, and Unicorn, 22, took 
Raleigh on September 28 after a day-long chase.  Barry managed to save the majority of 
his crew by disembarking them to a nearby island, and although Congress exonerated 
him for the loss he did not immediately receive another command in the navy and thus 
spent the next two years as a privateer.59   
 Finally, near the end of 1779, Congress named him commander of the 74-gun 
America, then under construction in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.  Frustrated by delays 
in its construction, Barry returned to private service as captain of the 14-gun brig 
America until September 5, 1780, when he was given command of the 910-ton 
Continental frigate Alliance, 36.60  Over the next four years Barry made multiple round 
trips to France delivering people, goods, and official messages.61  The most well-known 
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of his encounters while commanding Alliance took place on May 28, 1781, when Barry 
defeated the British ships Atlanta and Trespassy.62  His final voyage in the service of the 
Continental Navy took him to the West Indies, and while escorting the Duc de Lauzun to 
America Barry successfully captured HMS Sybil in the last naval battle of the 
Revolution. 
The Continental Navy's dissolution in 1785 found Barry the last Continental 
Navy officer on active duty.  He became senior captain in command of the frigate United 
States after the U.S. Navy’s establishment in 1794, and captured seven French ships 
during the Quasi-War.  Having provided services which eventually earned him the 
unofficial title "Father of the Navy," John Barry died due to complications with asthma 
on September 13, 1803.    
The varied familial backgrounds and geographic origins of the six captains 
greatly influenced their career arcs and motivations for service.  Given the New England 
domination of the early Marine Committee, it is likely that Hopkins’s Rhode Island 
background, along with the fact that his brother served on the committee, helped him 
secure appointment as commander-in-chief of the new navy when it was formed.  
Personal connections Lambert Wickes and John Barry formed during their years in the 
merchant community, especially their acquaintance with Robert Morris, probably also 
helped them secure a captaincy in the navy.  Prewar networks also aided Jones, and his 
initial appointment as the senior lieutenant in the Continental Navy was undoubtedly 
influenced by his connection to Marine Committee member and congressional 
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representative from North Carolina, Joseph Hewes, who had connections to Jones 
through the Freemasons.  That Hopkins and Wickes came from locally prominent 
households with previous records of public service may have also inclined them to seek 
public employment to continue their family legacies.  
While a captain's family and origin may have aided him in obtaining a 
commission, there is little evidence to suggest that the three foreign-born captains’ 
origins played a negative role in their careers.  McNeill secured the third spot on the 
captain’s list of 1776 thanks to his connections with John Hancock and Thomas 
Cushing, and his previous combat experience, and Barry the seventh.  Although Jones 
placed much farther down the list, his spot at eighteen was more likely due to his 
previous refusal of commands and lack of personal connections, rather than anti-Scottish 
sentiments.  Family origin did play a part in McNeill’s decision to serve, however, and 
his Protestant upbringing undoubtedly acted as his primary impetus for enlistment.  
Furthermore, the captains' prewar activities in the West Indies trade helped 
inform their understanding of duty.  New England mariners often went to sea between 
fifteen and eighteen, and those skilled enough for promotion often received command of 
a vessel by their early twenties.63  Though not all from New England, many of the six 
captains went to sea young: Barry and Barney at ages nine and twelve, Jones at 21, 
Wickes and McNeill probably in their teens.  Hopkins began his seagoing career in his 
early twenties, but similarly became master of a vessel within a few short years.  The 
men's experiences at sea provided them with vocational training, and working their way 
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up the ranks on merchant ships helped develop their sense of loyalty both upwards and 
downwards.   
Those notions of loyalty came into conflict with the professionalization of the 
military happening around the turn of the century, and along with their motivations for 
service helps to account for the disparate conduct each captain displayed in the 
Continental Navy.  Indeed, each captain experienced a vastly different career arc.  
Hopkins and McNeill achieved high appointments early in the war, but were forcibly 
removed from the service due to perceived misconduct.  Wickes ranked significantly 
lower than Hopkins or McNeill on the 1776 captain’s list, but he achieved a great deal 
during the war and served as the first Continental captain overseas before his death.  Due 
to financial difficulties caused by the navy's lack of ships, Barney and Barry were forced 
during different points in their careers to embrace private service.  Although both were 
offered positions in the U.S. Navy when it was established a decade after the Revolution 
ended and the Continental Navy was disbanded, Barney opted to pursue a career in the 
French Navy for egotistical reasons.  Financial necessity and the want of a ship also 
influenced Jones to accept employment in the Russian Navy after the war, though he 
faithfully served the Continental Navy during the Revolution even in times of financial 
distress.  Those incidents during their diverse careers, among others, suggest that 
decisions to join the navy and actions while in command were influenced by the 
complex process of professionalization, as well as the motivational factors of patriotism, 
a desire for fame and professional advancement, and financial stability.
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CHAPTER III 
 
CONCEPTS OF DUTY 
 
The conflict between understandings of professional duty, and personal 
conceptions of a captain's loyalty upwards and downwards, heavily influenced each 
captain's conduct and career arc in the Continental Navy.  Professional duty, the 
formation of which was an ongoing process, required the maintenance of naval hierarchy 
and deference to one's superiors; orders were meant to be obeyed whether one agreed 
with them or not, and criticisms of superior officers were seen as gross misconduct.  
Additionally, captains had an obligation to promote the wellbeing of other officers and 
sailors, and to conduct themselves in a professional manner towards captured enemy 
combatants.  While all six captains expected the men around them to adhere to the above 
principles, personal observance was situational.  Only some of the captains always 
followed their sailing orders or other instructions, and all but Lambert Wickes had 
particularly vocal disagreements with other officers and their superiors.  Furthermore, in 
certain instances John Paul Jones's treatment of crewmembers did not match his 
conception of loyalty downwards even as he made rigorous efforts to secure the release 
of American prisoners in Britain.  Regardless of his own conduct, however, each captain 
fully expected professionalism from the sailors and officers around him.  
Whereas other captains were largely quiet concerning general attributes that were 
valuable in officers, Jones wrote prolifically about the qualities he felt an officer should 
possess. In his opinion, "a Captain of the Navy [should] be a man of Strong and well 
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connected Sense with a tolerable education, a gentleman as well as a Seaman both in 
Theory and Practice."1  Furthermore, he believed naval officers "ought to be as far 
superior to the Abilities of Officers in the army" given the "greater number of 
[complicated] cases, than can … possibly happen on the land."2  Officers also had a duty 
to create enthusiasm for a captain's orders, and to recognize a plan's benefit beyond 
financial gain.  The officers of Ariel received high praise from Jones on this final point, 
as their conduct demonstrated "the great advantage of having several good officers" who 
encouraged sailors to do their duty. 3 
Many of the men employed in the Continental Navy were deficient in those 
standards by Jones's estimation, and the navy made "no very brilliant or promising 
beginning " by 1778. 4  Probably influenced by his dissatisfying placement on the 
October 10, 1776, seniority list, Jones could not "but lament that no little delicacy hath 
been Observed in the appointment, and promotion of Officers, in the Sea Service, many 
of whom are not only grossly illeterate [sic], but want even the Capacity of commanding 
Merchant Vessells [sic]." His opinion of officers aboard Ranger during the 1778 raid on 
Whitehaven, who "persuaded [the crew] that they had the right to judge whether a 
measure that was proposed to them was good or bad," reflected Jones's disappointment.  
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Not only did Ranger's officers conduct themselves contrary to their duty, but the sailors 
exceeded the role afforded to their place in the hierarchy.5   
Jones exhibited his belief that sailors and officers had a duty to obey orders from 
their superiors during other points in his career as well.  Early on, the Mungo Maxwell 
and Tobago incident demonstrated Jones did not take dereliction of duty lightly, and he 
resolutely dealt with men who he determined lacked discipline, or who encouraged 
insubordination.  Later, during his command of Ranger when Jones accused Thomas 
Simpson of encouraging mutinous attitudes and of disobeying direct orders while acting 
as prize officer aboard Drake, he suspended Simpson and ordered him placed under 
arrest.6  Simpson obtained release after 77 members of the crew signed a petition to the 
American Commissioner, but Jones continued his efforts against Simpson and called for 
a court-martial.  When Captain Abraham Whipple refused to serve on the court martial 
panel, arguing that Jones had released Simpson from his parole in previous 
correspondence, Jones called the decision a denial of “justice to his own honor and to 
that of the service.”7      
Jones pursued satisfaction for another case of insubordination, perhaps the most 
severe of the entire war, after his cruise on Bon Homme Richard in 1779.  Pierre 
Landais, commander of the 28-gun frigate, Alliance, became defiant early in the voyage: 
he “behaved towards [Jones] with great disrespect,” and told Jones that he would chase 
enemy ships “when and where he thought proper, and in every other matter that 
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concerned the Service," thereby challenging Jones's authority as the squadron 
commander.  On August 25, Landais took it upon himself to leave the squadron and 
cruise alone, and did not rendezvous with Jones until September 1 off the northwest 
coast of Scotland.  Having rejoined the squadron, Landais continued to “[pretend] that he 
[was] authorized to act independent of [Jones’s] command,” and again abandoned the 
squadron to cruise on his own until the middle of September, just two days before the 
action with Serapis.  In an effort to take the glory of Serapis's capture for himself, and 
probably influenced by his disdain for Jones, Landais fired into Richard once during an 
early part of the engagement, then proceeded to sail around lackadaisically until 
returning and firing another broadside into Richard's port quarter, and a third into its 
forecastle.8  Various crewmembers signed a complete list of Landais’s infractions during 
the cruise, 25 in all, on Jones’s behalf, but Landais escaped formal charges for his 
misconduct during the engagement with Serapis.9 
Acting as commander-in-chief of the Continental Navy, Esek Hopkins also 
valued naval hierarchy, though he provided fewer examples of his thoughts on the 
subject than did other Continental captains.  One illustration that does survive, however, 
is Hopkins’s recommendation of Captain Robert Wiles, who he said “behaved like a 
good Officer has follow’d my Orders and been beneficial to the squadron.”10  Obedience 
to orders, and therefore the maintenance of hierarchy, was important enough to Hopkins 
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to warrant inclusion in his recommendation, and tied into his ideas of the characteristics 
necessary in a good officer. 
Additionally, Hopkins believed that regardless of rank, each man had a duty to 
perform to the best of his ability.  To this end, Hopkins's recommendation also 
highlighted Wiles's beneficial contribution to the squadron.  An officer's responsibilities 
consisted of more than simply following orders; each had a duty to perform to his 
utmost.  Hopkins passed favorable judgment on himself in this regard even after his 
suspension, writing that “it gives me great Satisfaction that in my own Judgement I have 
done everything in my power … for the Service of my Country."  
Though more immediately concerned with the conduct of fellow seamen, 
Continental captains were also critical of the neglect shown by counterparts on land.  
The merchant community and agents who handled prize money were frequently accused 
of hindering the navy's operations, and of neglecting their own duty towards the cause of 
liberty.  Hector McNeill became quickly disillusioned with the "Sleepy Agents, 
disheartened tradesmen and distress'd seamen who frequent the Streets of Boston," and 
referred to supply agents as "drones in the Common wealth."11  Hopkins also 
encountered the strength of private interest in his home state when he petitioned for 
assistance in manning Continental vessels, though his own lack of influence likely 
perturbed him more than the existence of private interest itself.12  
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While captains clearly expected deference from their subordinates and respectful 
treatment by their superiors, their own levels of cooperation with men in superior 
positions did not always meet the same standard.  Although naval commanders were 
often expected to act with some degree of independence while at sea, especially given 
communication lag during this period, Barney's actions directly conflicted with his 
sailing orders on various occasions, and Hopkins exercised an extraordinarily liberal 
interpretation of his orders to protect the Southern coast.  Furthermore, excluding 
Wickes, captains did not always follow hierarchy regarding respect for one's superiors.  
Captains were often outspoken about the shortcomings they perceived in others, and 
were vocal about personal disputes.   
During his 1777 Congressional trial, multiple people accused Hopkins of 
speaking poorly of Congress.  According to Lieutenant James Sellers of Warren, 
Hopkins called Congress “a pack of damned fools,” and further commented, “If I 
[Hopkins] should follow their directions, the whol [sic] country would be ruined….”  
Similar accusations were brought by James Brewer and John Truman, who testified that 
Hopkins referred to Congress as "a pack of ignorant lawyers clerks who knew nothing at 
all."  Officers on Warren also indicted Hopkins for speaking "publickly [sic] in the most 
profane and disrespectful manner" about the Congress, and calling its members "wholly 
unacquainted with mankind, and perfectly acquainted with their business, and if their 
measures were complied with the country would be undone."13 
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 In addition to publicly criticizing his superiors, Hopkins took wide liberty with 
his orders in 1776, which provides the most extreme example of any of the six officers 
disregarding his sailing orders.  Ordered to defend the Southern coastline, and to then 
disrupt British activity off of Rhode Island, Hopkins instead took his squadron to the 
Bahamas to raid Nassau for military supplies.  Although some of his stated reasons for 
bypassing his ordered objectives were understandable, as the following chapter will 
detail, they were likely not his primary motivation.   
Hopkins's return from Nassau also provides an example of his dereliction of 
duty.  Commenting on the sailors in his squadron who were involved in the battle with 
Glasgow, he said they “had got too much liquor … to be fit for duty.”14  Although the 
sailors undoubtedly neglected their duty, Hopkins failed in his instructed duty as 
commander-in-chief to keep his squadron in order.  His ineptitude as a commander and 
organizer were part of the reason Hopkins received orders to appear before Congress in 
June 1776 to explain why the Marine Board's efforts to "put Continental Ships upon a 
respectable Footing … have been frustrated and neglected in a manner unaccountable to 
them…."15  While it could be argued that Hopkins also neglected his duty to perform to 
the utmost of his abilities, William M. Fowler Jr. suggests Hopkins simply did not 
possess the qualities demanded for the position he held.16 
Like Hopkins, Joshua Barney also disobeyed orders and disrespected his 
superiors on multiple occasions.  He temporarily lost control of his emotions in reaction 
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to Captain William Stone's failure to engage one of Roebuck's tenders, Maria, during its 
encounter with Hornet in April 1776.  Although "the force of the sloop [Hornet] was so 
far superior to that of the Roebuck's tender," when given the opportunity to deliver a 
point blank broadside Stone ordered Barney "not to fire, as he had 'no inclination for 
shedding blood!'"17  The order was so contrary, as he thought, to every principle of duty 
and honor, that Barney flung his still-burning match-stick at the captain's head.  Many on 
board witnessed this severe breach of etiquette towards Barney’s superior.  Perhaps due 
to embarrassment, Stone abandoned the ship immediately after arriving in Philadelphia 
and never brought charges against Barney.   
Captain James Nicholson's actions during the night of March 31, 1778, also 
caused Barney to violate his professional duty as an inferior officer.  The frigate Virginia 
ran aground in an attempt to bypass a British squadron, but rather than fight, or at the 
very least scuttle the ship so it could not be taken by the enemy, Nicholson “ran on deck, 
ordered the barge to be hoisted out, and without taking time even to secure his papers or 
private signals, left the frigate, and made good his escape to the shore.”18  When 
Nicholson returned to his captured ship under a flag of truce to retrieve personal 
belongings which were left on board in his haste to escape, Barney released a tirade 
upon Nicholson in front of his captors; the outburst received no reply.19   
While Barney felt obligated in some instances to abide by instructions, on one 
occasion stating "but orders must be obeyed" when justifying his reasons for putting to 
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sea during a gale, he often failed to comply with orders that implored him to refrain from 
unnecessary combat.  He disobeyed one such order while in command of General 
Washington.  Robert Morris instructed Barney to "on no account … risk your ship or 
delay your voyage by chasing vessels, making prizes, or engaging, unless in the last 
necessity."20  Disregarding his orders, Barney attacked a privateer brig of sixteen-guns in 
an attempt to take it as a prize, receiving damage to his mizenmast in the process.21  He 
also detoured briefly one night on his return trip to Philadelphia to fire on a group of 
loyalist refugee vessels anchored in the bay.  In both instances Barney ignored the 
section of his orders which forbade him to risk his ship or engage the enemy unless 
absolutely necessary. Barney's "impulsive character" was so well known that Morris also 
implored Barney to "take care not to chase any vessel, but to avoid as much as possible 
everything which can either delay or endanger you" when assigned a mission to carry 
diplomatic papers to Europe.22 
Jones also recognized the importance of hierarchy, even going so far as to say the 
imposition of limitations on a captain’s authority was necessary.23  However, while he 
generally followed sailing orders, in one case Jones ignored instructions that curbed the 
financial resources available to him.  Expenditures he incurred for outfitting Ariel in 
1780 caused Benjamin Franklin particular distress after receiving a bill totaling nearly 
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100,000 livres for Ariel's expenses, "having twice entreated you [Jones] for god Sake to 
consider my Circumstances, the Difficulties I had to provide for so many Expences [sic], 
and not take any thing but what was absolutely necessary…." In particular, Franklin 
criticized Jones's purchase of 6,000 livres worth of shot which he thought unnecessary, 
and over 20,000 livres worth of slops.24  
Other Continental captains likewise recognized the importance of maintaining 
naval hierarchy, but did not always follow instructions or keep criticisms of their 
superiors to themselves.  McNeill was assigned to cruise with Captains John Manley and 
Thomas Thompson on October 23, 1776, even though “McNeil and Manly it is said like 
the Jews and Samaritans will have no connections or intercourse….”25 Aware of how 
others perceived his relationship with Manley, McNeill wrote to Thompson that he “sett 
[sic] up a resolution to obey implicitly every one of his commands to the utmost of his 
power,” and that he would follow Manley “as the Jackall does the Lyon [sic], without 
Grumbling except in my Gizard [sic].”26   
Although McNeill had previously resolved to follow Manley's orders without 
complaint, he wrote Manley a letter accusing him of almost causing their ships to 
collide, "[giving Manley] my mind freely on his misconduct."27  McNeill did not reserve 
his comments for his close friends or Manley, however, and upon his return he submitted 
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a scathing letter to the Continental Marine Committee reporting Manley's actions.  
Providing the Marine Committee with his opinion, rather than solely operational 
commentary, McNeill stated that Manley was "unequall [sic] to the Command with 
which he has been intrusted [sic]– he being ignorant, Obstinate Overbearing and 
Tyranical [sic] beyond description…."28 
Like McNeill, Barry did not quietly suffer confrontational attitudes or poor 
decisions by his superiors even though he expected deference from his inferiors.  The 
most demonstrative examples were Barry's disagreements with Francis Hopkinson 
involving the botched sinking of Effingham.  Having lost Philadelphia in September 
1777,  George Washington recommended the scuttling of frigates Effingham and 
Washington at the end of October to avoid them falling into British hands.  Hopkinson 
and Thomas Wharton followed Washington's advice, and ordered Barry and Captain 
Thomas Read to sink their vessels.  When Barry confronted Hopkinson about the 
decision, Hopkinson patronizingly replied that he preferred "to take General 
Washington's opinion" over Barry's.  Upset by the order itself, irritated by Hopkinson's 
demeanor, and further rankled that no one knowledgeable of ships had been involved in 
the decision, Barry defiantly told Hopkinson that he would only sink Effingham if 
Congress was consulted first.29   
In addition to holding an opposing view over whether the ship should have been 
sunk in the first place, Barry also rightfully blamed Hopkinson for the ineffectual 
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scuttling of the frigate.  Unacquainted with the tide and the exacting procedure required 
to scuttle a vessel, Hopkinson's attempt at sinking Effingham resulted in the ship nearly 
capsizing, and coming to rest on its side in the Delaware River.  The two men exchanged 
words during the operation to re-sink the vessel correctly, and Barry remarked to 
Hopkinson, "I don't value you anymore than my duty requires," and "had [you minded 
your duty] this ship would not be in its present condition."30 
Of the six captains, only Lambert Wickes strictly followed the 
professionalization of duty concerning orders and hierarchy; he never spoke ill of his 
superiors, and always endeavored to only act in accordance with instructions from his 
direct superiors.31  Wickes’s penchant for adhering to the chain of command displayed 
itself early in the war during actions on the Delaware.  Upon hearing that British ships 
were spotted at Port Penn, the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety sought permission 
from the Secret Committee of Congress to have Wickes supply boats and volunteers for 
the port’s defense.  When Captain Thomas Read approached Wickes for help, Wickes 
replied that “he received no orders and could not let any of his Men go without it, tho’ 
wish’d at the same time to do it, and would Immediately on Receipt of orders.”  The 
Secret Committee’s orders arrived later that morning, and Wickes complied with Read’s 
request.32 
 The effort Wickes expended to stay in the port of St. Malo after his successful 
cruise with Dolphin and Lexington also reflected his endeavor to only obey orders from 
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his superiors.  Upon arrival, French authorities directed the American captains to leave 
port and return to America or risk sequestration.33  However, having received no orders 
from the American Commissioners, Wickes and the other American captains attempted 
to stay in port by making the case that their ships required repairs to make the voyage.  
This was not altogether untrue: Dolphin possessed sailing qualities far below the other 
two American ships even in the best of shape, and at this point was “disabled in her 
mast,” and Wickes had sawed beams and thrown Reprisal’s guns overboard to escape 
the 74-gun Burford before sailing into St. Malo.34  As the local Admiralty officers 
became more impatient and tried to enforce Louis XVI’s sequestration mandate, Wickes 
implored the American Commissioners for guidance: 
Some new Demand is made almost every day derogatory to our honour [sic] as 
free and Independent States, which cannot be Reasonably Complied with on my 
Part, unless ordered by You … I beg you will inform how far you think I may be 
justifiable in Complying with the orders of the Administration for my 
Governance….35    
 
Unable to delay any longer, and having finally received orders from the Commissioners 
to sail, Wickes departed for America after over a month of frustration and resistance on 
September 14, 1777.36   
In addition to the general maintenance of hierarchy, the six captains also believed 
officers owed a loyalty to their crews.  Similar to their treatment of hierarchy, however, 
the ways and degree to which each captain fulfilled that duty varied.  All were generally 
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concerned about whether their crews received pay, and although keeping the crew happy 
benefitted the captain, their petitions were more likely to mention the crew's welfare 
rather than how desertion or mutiny could affect the service.   
Each captain also noted the general good conduct of their crews after successful 
engagements, but only Wickes made unsolicited positive comments concerning specific 
individuals.  For example, Wickes recommended Samuel Nicholson in January 1777, 
resulting in Nicholson’s command of Dolphin.37  Captain Henry Johnston of Lexington 
also received high praise from Wickes after their first cruise together, reporting  "I had 
not the pleasure of knowing Captain Johnston before I could not give him a Caracter 
[sic] Sufficient to his Merit & Now beg leave to recommend him as a Very brave Active 
Officer & worthy of your Honours [sic] utmost Attention."38  A further acquaintance, 
Captain John Green, also benefited from an endorsement by Wickes.  Hearing of 
Green’s unemployment, Wickes sent a message to the Commissioners requesting 
employment on Green's behalf, "as I am persuaded he will do every thing in his power to 
Serve the American cause & is Very Capible [sic] of Commanding either a Merchant 
man or Vessell [sic] of War."  Thanks to Wickes, Green received an appointment on a 
Continental ship and served until the end of the war.39 
 Men not eligible for a captaincy also received promotions thanks to Wickes.  He 
recommended the promotion of Lieutenant John Elliott, commander of marines on 
Reprisal, to serve as captain of the marines on board a new 26-gun frigate under 
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construction in Nantes.  Wickes thought Elliott "entitled to Perferment in Prefference 
[sic] to any other person, as has been in the Service from the Commencement of the 
Reprisal's being Army & behaved himself Very Well."40  
Whereas Wickes looked after his crews and fellow officers by helping their 
careers, Barney primarily concerned himself with his crews' morale and financial 
welfare. Captain Thomas Drysdale was a major influence on Barney in this respect.  
Even as Barney came to expect obedience from his own men, Drysdale's "conduct 
towards his brother-in-law (to use his own words) '[which] was always very severe and 
brutal,'" taught him the effect "tyranny and ill treatment" could have on a crew's 
morale.41  In return for willing subordination, Barney felt obligated to promote the 
wellbeing of his crew.  Having brought the Sidney into port at Gibraltar during his first 
stint of command, Barney faced the dilemma of how to repair his ship.  While not his 
only consideration, the welfare of his crew must have played a part in his decision to 
accept a sizeable advance of money to get the ship under way, instead of releasing the 
crewmen and perhaps leaving them stranded in a foreign port while he waited for further 
instructions.42  Consideration for his crew also probably played a part in undertaking the 
ill-advised engagement involving General Washington in 1782.  As Louis Norton points 
out, "Barney felt that the captain of a privateer had a responsibility to his crew, who 
could make their fortunes by capturing prizes, not delivering messages."43  Barney's 
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personal financial success also depended on capturing ships however, so his actions 
should not be taken as wholly unselfish. 
Jones also sought to aid his crewmembers by frequently petitioning 
commissioners and agents for prize money due to his men.  In trying to reform the 
Continental prize money system, he commented in 1777 that "those poor fellows who 
have faithfully Served the term of their enlistment are detered [sic] from re-Entering … 
so that it makes my heart Bleed to see them half Naked at this Severe Season."44 Jones 
wrote often during his time in Europe concerning prize money as well, usually in similar 
language to the aforementioned letter.  For instance, in 1780 he lamented that the "poor 
men, who so bravely served under my Command have not yet received a Sol … either 
for Wages or Prizes."45   
Although surely interested in his own share of the prize monies and in correcting 
the recruitment difficulties that plagued the Continental Navy, it is clear Jones was also 
concerned with the money for his crews' sakes.  In two instances Jones even paid the 
wages due to the men of Alfred and Providence out of his own pocket.46  In exchange for 
making Jones their agent to collect prize monies on their behalf, Jones agreed to pay the 
crews himself.  Wary of corruption in the system, however, some crewmembers 
misunderstood Jones's proposition and complained to Esek Hopkins. Writing on March 
8, 1777, to the Marine Committee, Esek Hopkins referenced their protests, saying, “You 
also have a copy … of several complaints which I have from time to time received 
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against Captn. Jones, and I have had a great number from the common people for his 
refusing to pay their Wages without they would make him their agent.”47  Though 
misinterpreted, Jones's efforts were examples of his concern for loyal crews, and his 
efforts to encourage re-enlistment in the navy by ensuring prompt payment.  
Captain McNeill did not go as far as Jones in trying to reform the prize money or 
wage systems, but still lobbied on behalf of his crew after he returned from his cruise 
that resulted in the capture, and subsequent loss, of the British frigate Fox.  Not only did 
he request money for crew wages, but he also questioned what "provision [should] be 
made for the Familys [sic] of the Men we have Lost in the Fox, [and how] the relatives 
of the few Slain [could] apply for their Bountys [sic]."48  
A captain's loyalty to fellow sailors and officers also extended to prisoners.  Each 
captain treated enemy prisoners well, and concerned themselves with the condition of 
American prisoners in British hands.  Jones in particular dedicated himself to retrieving 
American prisoners overseas.  In 1778, Jones eagerly sought to arrange an exchange of 
200 prisoners he had taken during his cruise when he captured Drake for American 
seamen held in England.  Upon receiving word from French naval commander Comte 
D'Orvilliers that the prisoners might be given up without an exchange, Jones resolved to 
try and send the prisoners straight to America, as he was "so fully … convinced of the 
bad policy of releasing prisoners, especially Seamen, without an exchange that I am 
determined never to do it while there remains an alternative…."49  Jones also held 
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Captain Richard Pearson and his crew prisoners after the engagement with Serapis in  
the hopes of exchanging the British captain and his men for Captain Gustavus 
Conyngham and "an Equal number and denomination of Americans."50   
Sympathizing with "the horrors of hopeless captivity when the brave are 
overpowered and made prisoners of War," Jones devised a plan to aid American 
prisoners in 1778 while he was in command of Ranger.  He intended to capture Lord 
Selkirk and use him to affect a prisoner exchange with Britain for captured American 
seamen, but Lord Selkirk’s absence from his home on April 23 when Jones landed on St. 
Mary's Isle foiled the plan, and the only thing "captured" from the Selkirk manor was the 
family silver .51  Hearing of the Countess of Selkirk's admirable behavior during the 
event, Jones acted the gentleman and later returned the loot at his own expense.  
Wickes also exerted efforts to benefit captured American sailors.  Following his 
initial cruise in European waters, he proposed a prisoner exchange to the American 
Commissioners.  The Commissioners wrote to Lord Stormont, Britain’s ambassador in 
Paris, informing him that "Captain Wickes … has now in his hands near 100 British 
seamen [and] desires to know whether an exchange may be made with him for an equal 
number of American seamen, now prisoners in England."52  In another instance, upon 
hearing of Captain John Nicholson's imprisonment along with the rest of Hornet's crew 
in Falmouth Prison, Wickes and Captain Samuel Nicholson submitted a plea to the 
American Commissioners to "please to appoint some mode or Method to furnish them 
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with a trifle of Money in order to Releave [sic] their present Necessitys [sic], as such a 
Conduct on your parts will tend to the Softning [sic] & Relieving their Sufferings."  
Nicholson and Wickes further offered to "Readily & Willingly assist them as far as our 
Money or Credit will go," though they felt the Commissioners' help would be more 
reliable, and arrive more quickly.53 
Likely done in an effort to turn public opinion against the harsh treatment of 
American prisoners by the British, British prisoners taken during Wickes's cruises in 
European waters were handled with respect.  Wickes restored personal belongings to the 
captains of the ships he took, and gave them an inordinate amount of freedom in port 
while he awaited word on what to do with his prisoners.  This genial treatment continued 
even after the British captains wrote letters of protest and remonstrance for 
compensation of their ships.54  Wickes's standard reserve buckled slightly upon hearing 
the captains had claimed he mistreated them, writing "I Am very Sorry to See that those 
Gentlemen are So Abandoned To Al Sence of Honoor [sic]" for spreading falsehoods.55  
The General Advertiser, a newspaper in Liverpool, also later reported of Wickes's cruise 
in the Irish Sea that "the People in general speak in the warmest terms of the humane 
treatment they met with from the commander of the Reprisal and Lexington…."56 
McNeill also made efforts to relieve the suffering of American prisoners.  In 
1777, he implored the Massachusetts Council to use prisoners from Fox to free 
Americans held by the British; many, he pleaded, were suffering and had families that 
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required attention.57  For his part, McNeill sent funds to American prisoners, and 
provided assistance to the families of other sailors who were captured with whom he was 
familiar.58  
Although Joshua Barney did not appeal to British officials or American 
representatives for prisoner exchanges, he did cooperate with Admiral John Byron 
towards the betterment of conditions aboard British prison hulks during one of his 
periods of imprisonment.59  Sent to replace Lord Richard Howe, Admiral Byron 
immediately moved the American prisoners to larger ships and ordered improvement in 
their care.  The Admiral relocated Barney to his flagship, Ardent, and Barney acted as 
the admiral's intermediary between the prisoners and their captors, helping Byron 
determine the "condition and wants of the prisoners," and improve the quality of their 
treatment.60 
The amiable treatment Barney experienced at the hands of some of his British 
captors likely helped him develop what Louis Norton, a recent biographer, refers to as 
Barney's "self-imposed code of ethics."  Whenever he could Barney made sure to pay in 
kind and take good care of British officers who fell under his charge.  In the exemplary 
case of Lieutenant James Gray, captured in December 1777 after a failed attempt to take 
an American sloop, Barney "procured a flag of truce … to obtain a supply of clothes and 
other little personal comforts" from Lieutenant Gray’s ship, Otter.  The captain of Otter 
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sent back a present of porter and English cheese in response, as well as a letter thanking 
Barney for his kindness.61  
British prisoners also singled out John Barry for his good treatment.  After being 
taken captive by Barry in 1776, William Goodrich wrote to his brother that "I was 
treated Extreamly Jenteal [sic] by Capt Berry [sic]."62  Prisoners Barry took on his way 
to Europe in Alliance, including officers from the British ship Ramilies, also reported 
fair treatment by the captain, one saying that they did not suffer any "confinement, [nor] 
abridgement of food…."63  
Although Jones remarked “it is bad policy in superiors to behave towards their 
inferiors indiscriminately, as though they were of a lower species,” it appears that only 
Jones violated the duty the six captains believed an officer owed to his crew.64  His 
outbursts towards others provide a picture of an idealistic man who was prone to 
frustration and temper.  Nathaniel Fanning recalled multiple instances of violence by 
Jones during his command of Bon Homme Richard.  First, after a disagreement with the 
captain of Monsieur, a privateer who abandoned the squadron after it took its first prize, 
Fanning states that Jones “struck several of his officers with his speaking trumpet over 
their heads, and ordered one of his lieutenants under confinement” because of their 
failure to engage Monsieur before it was out of gun range.65  On another occasion, Jones 
got into an argument with one of his lieutenants, and “kicked him on the breach several 
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times” as the lieutenant descended the ladder.  In both instances the lieutenants were 
later invited to dine with the captain, and “thus it was with Jones, passionate to the 
highest degree one minute, and the next, ready to make a reconciliation.”66  Jones also 
kicked Fanning on September 1, 1780, while serving on Ariel—a detail which Morison 
believes led Fanning to exaggerate the extravagant decadence of a party Jones threw on 
board.67   
Fanning's violent encounter with Jones may also account for accusations 
concerning Jones’s treatment of General John Sullivan's nephew who sought passage to 
America on Ariel.68  Fanning records that Jones repeatedly denied Sullivan's requests to 
go on shore, and that young Sullivan finally insisted he be allowed to leave the ship.  
Jones drew his sword in response, and threatened to run Sullivan through if he tried to 
disembark.  After Sullivan attempted to leave anyway, Jones placed him in irons.69  
However, if the story were true, General Sullivan would probably not have provided 
Jones a letter of introduction to Meshech Weare, the President of New Hampshire, in 
1781.70        
 All of the captains' demeanors as Continental officers were heavily influenced by 
their understandings of professional duty and their conceptions of individualism, 
resistance to authority, and loyalty upwards and downwards.  They expected men below 
them to follow orders to the utmost of their ability and without criticism, and they 
                                                 
66
 Ibid., 28. 
67
 Samuel E. Morison, John Paul Jones,303.   
68
 John Sullivan was a major general in the Continental Army.  
69
 Barnes, Fanning's Narrative, 90-96. 
70
 John Sullivan to President Weare, 3 July1781, as quoted in Horace Porter and Franklin Sanborn, eds., 
Letters of John Paul Jones (Boston, MA: The Bibliophile Society, 1905), 17.   
58 
 
insisted on respectful treatment from their own superiors.  Additionally, the captains 
believed Continental officers owed a responsibility to other American sailors, both to 
their own crews and to those who had fallen into British hands.   
While each captain sought to enforce professional standards on the men around 
him, all but Lambert Wickes sometimes failed to adhere to those principles.  Hopkins 
took wide liberty with his sailing orders when he sailed to Nassau, and Barney often 
disregarded instructions to avoid engagements.  Also, many captains did not show 
deference to their superiors even as they expected it from their crews and inferior 
officers.  Hopkins faced accusations of insulting Congress, McNeill openly confronted 
his superior John Manley and wrote a scathing indictment of the captain, and on multiple 
occasions Barry traded words with Francis Hopkinson.  In Jones's case, his interactions 
with subordinates sometimes lacked the civility he believed they deserved.   
Although prewar experiences help explain why captains violated their 
understandings of professional duty at points in their career, their motivations for service 
are also suggestive.  Captains may have disobeyed their orders in an effort to accomplish 
objectives, such as the capture of prizes, that would provide increased renown or 
financial gain.  Patriotism could explain their vocal reactions to men who they believed 
violated their duty, and had therefore paid a disservice to the United States.  The 
following chapters expand on these motivations, and detail how differing desires for 
fame and professional advancement, patriotism, and financial stability influenced the 
career arcs of each captain.
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CHAPTER IV 
A "PASSION FOR FAME" AND PROFESSIONAL ADVANCEMENT 
 
 According to Douglas Adair, fame, the aspiration to leave one's mark on the 
world by appealing to a public, inclusive audience both "horizontally in space and 
vertically in time," was the chief motivation for many of the Founding Fathers.1  To an 
extent, this also applies to the six Continental captains.  Their decisions to serve in the 
Continental Navy, as well as their conduct as American officers, were motivated in-part 
by a desire for renown.  However, the degree to which fame and promotion acted as a 
stimulus for each captain varied.  The writings and actions of John Paul Jones, Esek 
Hopkins, and Joshua Barney provide strong evidence that each aspired to attain public 
recognition, while those of Lambert Wickes, Hector McNeill, and John Barry suggest 
they were more motivated by other factors. 
 In keeping with the modesty expected of gentlemen of the era, some captains 
professed to have no ambition towards higher station or renown.  Although McNeill 
showed appreciation after receiving a compliment from John Manley, he prefaced his 
enthusiasm by writing "Titles & honours [sic] I despise them both."2  Hopkins also 
denied having a desire for fame; in multiple instances he offered to resign his position as 
commander-in-chief in deference to "better men," and he told the Continental Marine 
Committee that he aspired to "no Command further than you Approve of."3  Regular 
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petitions concerning rank, pay, and various operational proposals also gave Jones ample 
opportunities and reasons to deny ulterior motives.  In an early letter in which he 
complained of the quality of commissioned officers, he remarked that his own enlistment 
"was not actuated by Motives of self interest."4 Writing to General Potemkin in 1789, 
Jones also claimed to "have never bent a knee to self interest, nor drawn my sword for 
hire."5 
The very act of pursuing or accepting a commission as an officer in the 
Continental Navy, however, suggests the pursuit of public favor as at least a partial 
motivation.  The vast majority of American ships that fought in the war were privateers.6  
Provided that a ship enjoyed a competent crew, a capable captain, and a bit of luck, 
privateers could expect to turn a tidy profit from the sale of cargo and ships they 
captured.  Importantly, privateers were paid the full amount of their capture's worth, 
while the Marine Committee's prize regulations of November 25, 1775, reserved for the 
government two thirds of a prize's sale if it was a merchantman, or half if the prize was a 
ship of war.  Thus, from a financial point of view, the Continental Navy was a less 
attractive employment option than was service as a privateer.   Privateering remained 
more appealing for financial gain even after the Congress relinquished its right to a 
portion of the proceeds from sales of captured men-of-war—though it retained its 
portion of the profit from the sale of captured merchantmen—plus privateers were free 
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to solely pursue prizes rather than run errands or perform convoy duty.7  In 1776, 
Congress licensed 136 privateers to ply the waves in search of English ships, and in 
1781 the number rose to 449.8  These, it should be noted, were in addition to privateers 
sanctioned by individual states.  Privateering's continued popularity was also reflected in 
the constant recruitment difficulties suffered by the navy; Continental ships often sat for 
months without an adequate number of crewmen, and rarely put to sea with a full 
complement.     
While the Continental Navy could not compete with privateers in profitability, it 
certainly provided more incentives in terms of prestige.  As the commander of a 
Continental ship, a captain was more likely to have his actions publicized than if he were 
one of the masses of privateers.  If he was fitting out a ship or visiting an American port 
a captain would also certainly interact with leading business and political leaders, and 
their commissions gave most captains access to political and social connections with the 
leading American statesmen. Those who visited France could, for example, meet with 
Benjamin Franklin and John Adams and possibly even French governmental leaders.  
Any who went to Philadelphia could meet Robert Morris and other officials in the 
American government. Finally, by serving in the Continental Navy a captain could deny 
that greed was a motivating factor in his service.  Instead, he could cite his dedication to 
higher principles, such as the defense of liberty, as Jones often did.          
Although sincere in considering himself a "Citizen of the World" employed in 
the cause of independence and defense of human rights, Jones's "desire for fame [was] 
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infinite," and he coveted honors, titles, and displays of preferment from men in 
prominent positions who were "above the Common Cast."9  He lost few opportunities to 
ingratiate himself in correspondence to others, and often included elaborately conceived 
passages of gratitude that reaffirmed his commitment to performing well and 
maintaining the confidence of men who showed him support.  Jones perceived slights 
against him as quickly as he recognized praise, and many of his letters reveal a deep 
sensitivity about his honor, about how the public interpreted his position relative to other 
captains, and about his relationships with men of high station. 
Jones's obsession with his rank during his career in the navy is the most salient 
example of his egotism.  Though pleased with his promotion to captain, his placement of 
eighteenth of twenty-four on Congress's officer seniority list of October 10, 1776, made 
him furious.10  Jones felt particularly insulted because a number of men who joined the 
navy after he did, who had not demonstrated superior ability, were placed above him on 
the list.  Writing to the Marine Board three months later, Jones remarked that "As I am 
unconscious of any Neglect of duty or misconduct since my appointment at the first as 
Eldest Lieutenant of the Navy, I cannot suppose that you can have intended to set me 
aside in favor of any Man who did not at that time bear a Captains Commission…."11   
His statement to the Marine Board was less confrontational than many of Jones's 
subsequent letters.  He notified Joseph Hewes, representative from North Carolina, and 
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Robert Morris, that he could "not consider any man as my Senior Officer who durst not 
step forth at the beginning in such ships as the Alfred then was, nor will I ever draw my 
sword under the Command of any Man who was not in the Service as early as myself.”  
The American Commissioners in Paris also received a letter from Jones at the end of 
August 1777, asking if they could procure a frigate for him to correct the fact that "I am 
myself superseded by thirteen Persons, who cannot plead superior Services or Abilities," 
and again declared his refusal to fight for anyone who joined the navy before him 
“unless he hath merited a Preference by his superior Services and abilities.” To serve 
under such a person, he believed, would be the greatest disgrace, and worse hardship 
"than to be fairly broke, and expelled [from] the Service."12  
Although some of his correspondents may have sympathized with Jones's 
situation, he never received satisfaction for his placement on the seniority list of 1776.  It 
was one of the most crushing rebuffs of his career, as evidenced by his continued 
references to the event years after the fact.  In a letter written in 1779 to Samuel 
Huntington, the President of Congress, he characteristically criticized the seniority list 
complaining that "there are individuals [ranked above me] who can neither pretend to 
parts nor education and with whom … I would disdain to Associate."  He left it to the 
Congress to "Judge how this must affect a Man of honor and Sensibility!"  In another 
letter to Huntington specifically requesting redress for his rank, Jones declared that 
Congress "will not admit the Idea that I have been degraded from any fault or 
misconduct," although "I ought to be second in Rank in the American Navy." The issue 
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did not fade with the war, and Jones wrote another lengthy letter to Robert Morris in 
1783 which included complaints about his rank, as well as Jones's commentary on 
operations of the navy.13   
Beyond the issue of his ranking among Continental captains, Jones sought and 
valued other symbols of success.  He prized the "Superb Sword [presented to him by 
Louis XVI], with an inscription in Latin on the Blade that would do honor to the 
Greatest Admiral in History," and the title "Chevalier" bestowed upon him by the French 
king.  Jones signed his correspondence occasionally thereafter using his French title, and 
when Congress awarded him a gold medal, the plans for which he designed himself, it 
was presented to "Chevalier John Paul Jones."14  He also demonstrated his love for 
decorations during his service in the Russian Navy as a rear admiral.  When Jones 
discovered that the Order of Saint Anne, awarded to him for his role in the First and 
Second Battles of Liman, was the lowest of the decorations given, he petitioned 
Potemkin requesting the Order of Saint George, which Prince Charles De Nassau Siegen 
had received.15   
During his Continental service Jones often complained of conspiracies against 
him and insults against his honor, starting with the aforementioned issue of ranking 
below certain individuals which he called an undeserved "heavy Stigma."16  Jones 
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eagerly sought redress for his difficulties on Ranger involving Lieutenant Simpson, 
especially after he was directed to release the insubordinate officer on parole. Concerned 
that the situation could be misinterpreted, and that "every person who has gone from 
Europe to [America] within the last three months have taken with them the belief of my 
disgrace," Jones requested a letter from the American Commissioners that he could point 
to as proof that he had left Ranger of his own accord, and had consented to Simpson's 
release from parole.17 John Adams and Franklin responded with the requested letter, 
adding that Jones's departure from Ranger "cannot be any Injury to your Rank or 
Character…."18       
Jones also considered his inability to exact justice for Landais's misconduct 
during his cruise on Bon Homme Richard as evidence of a plot against him.  In this 
instance Jones was probably right.  Although he had the support of Benjamin Franklin, 
there is evidence to suggest that Arthur Lee made an effort to sabotage Jones's career.  
Lee went so far as to write a three-page letter in support of Landais's inexcusable 
conduct, and reaffirmed Landais's commission as the Continental captain in command of 
Alliance.19  Moreover, the political scheming in Congress extended to Jones's friends. 
When Jones arrived back in America, he wrote a letter to Franklin in which he expressed 
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the "deepest concern … to find how much such worth as yours was misrepresented, by 
your disappointed Enemies."20   
  Deeply concerned about how others perceived him, Jones was also sensitive to 
the opinions of people he held in high regard.  He worried about his reputation with King 
Louis and his court during the American Revolution, and in Russia he was aware that his 
dismissal was due to his decreased standing with Catherine.21  Jones also experienced 
anxiety over the long period he endured in Europe without a command, fearing he may 
have lost the favor of the men in high positions he regarded as friends.  For example, 
having received no orders or other correspondence from Franklin for some time in 
November, 1778, Jones lamented to Franklin that his "silence" had hurt him, and he 
expressed as much again to his friend Jonathan Williams in December.22   
 Although sensitive to negative perceptions, Jones took great satisfaction in  
congratulatory letters and signs of preferment or respect he received throughout his 
career.  He often mentioned his gratitude for the preference Congress showed him in 
various instances, such as his appointment as captain of Ranger, and in trying to procure 
Jones better ships even as the offers proved disingenuous or fell through.  The same was 
true of the favors he believed the Court of France had shown him.  Additionally, Jones 
appreciated letters from American leaders, and believed their attention reflected well on 
his merit and standing in the United States.  The continuance of such approbation, which 
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he held "as the greatest honor and most ample Reward," was often remarked as being the 
"ambition of [his] life."23        
 While Jones pursued and valued praise from others, he rarely conferred such 
words on others.  When reporting on his cruises, Jones always highlighted his own 
actions, and rarely included even a general mention about the performance of his ship's 
sailors unless his company had performed poorly.  The majority of sentences in a letter 
describing the capture of the Mellish in late 1776, for example, start with "I," and in the 
21-page report on the cruise that culminated in the capture of Serapis Jones did not 
mention the brave actions of any of his sailors or officers.24  Individual 
recommendations were also rarely provided by Jones; in an ironic twist, two of the men 
for whom he wrote commendations were Lieutenant Thomas Simpson, who caused 
Jones a great deal of grief, and Nathaniel Fanning, who criticized Jones in his later 
memoir.25     
 Jones's habit of emphasizing his own actions and minimalizing those of others 
did not go unnoticed.  In 1779, the Gazette de Leyden, a widely read international 
newspaper produced in the Netherlands, published “an extract of my [Jones's] journal” in 
which he provided unfavorable commentary on certain individuals.  Fearing damage to 
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his reputation from a passage preceding the article that left "room to suppose that it has 
been my intention to augment the merits of my own Services by diminishing those of 
others," Jones wrote a letter to the editor.  In addition to providing clarifications on his 
critiques in his private journal, Jones also uncharacteristically offered words of praise for 
some of the officers who served in the Bon Homme Richard squadron.26  Benjamin 
Franklin also bluntly addressed Jones's habit of seeing evil where there was none, and of 
providing little tribute to those who deserved mention, in correspondence to Jones in 
1780.  In the letter, Franklin proposed to Jones:  
if you should observe on occasion to give your officers and friends a little more 
praise than is their Due, and confess more fault than you can justly be charged 
with, you will only become the sooner for it a Great Captain.  Criticising [sic]  
and censuring almost every one you have to do with, will diminish friends, 
encrease [sic] enemies, and thereby hurt your affairs.27 
 
As is apparent from his continued obsession with rank, titles, and honor after the war, 
however, Jones did not take to heart Franklin's suggestion that he temper his ego, though 
some other factor may have influenced his actions in Russia where, other than brief 
sections in letters to Catherine the Great and Potemkin, Jones did not expound at great 
length upon the conspiracy against him in Russia that resulted in his fall from favor, and 
in his dismissal from Catherine's service.28   
 Esek Hopkins also displayed a desire for fame and professional advancement.  In 
addition to making a name for himself and advancing his professional station, Hopkins 
was also concerned with maintaining his family's social status.  Although work as a 
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merchantman or privateer had the potential to make a person wealthy, an appointment in 
an official capacity was more prestigious for the reasons previously discussed.  In a 
world that respected statesmen and other "gentlemanly" professions, as well as a family 
that had its history in public affairs, the transition from the private sector to public 
service represented an important step for Esek Hopkins.   
Hopkins worked as a privateer during the French and Indian War and 
commanded his own ship in the West Indies trade, but political reasons played as much 
or more of a role in his appointment in the Continental Navy as did his past experience.  
The creation of a navy was in itself a political act, and it was well known that the New 
England colonies would benefit the most from an official seagoing force.  Eventually 
made up of seven members, four of whom were New Englanders, the Continental 
Marine Committee was also a hotbed of New England provincialism.  Committee 
member John Adams had "a desire to see New England men … lead the nation in 
launching a navy," and fellow members Silas Deane and Stephen Hopkins both harbored 
personal ambitions and strong sectionalist outlooks.29  As a result, all of the initial 
captains appointed to the navy by the Marine Committee were from New England with 
the exception of Nicholas Biddle.30   
Multiple instances in Hopkins's career suggest that he shared his brother's strong 
sense of provincialism, and believed the Continental Navy's main purpose was to benefit 
the Northern colonies, specifically Rhode Island.  In one case he offered Rhode Island 
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and Connecticut Continental military stores that were not his to give away without first 
consulting Congress, and in another he moved the Continental squadron to his homeport 
of Providence.  When "earnestly persuaded to remove the squadron to Boston," James 
Brewer of Warren recalled Hopkins responded that "the ships shall not go to Boston, by 
God."31    
     The most drastic example of Hopkins's desire for fame was his decision to take 
his squadron to Nassau in March 1776, instead of defending the Southern coastline as his 
instructions had expressly ordered.  On the surface, and according to Hopkins, the 
decision was well reasoned.  First, he believed the supplies at Nassau were desperately 
needed by the Continental Army.32  Second, Hopkins reported that three or four days 
before he set sail on an intended course for Georgia, that he received intelligence of an 
additional British frigate in the area, and determined that the British squadrons were too 
strong for the infant American squadron.  Furthermore, according to Hopkins his officers 
lacked resolve, and a large portion of his sailors were overcome with sickness which 
made combating a numerically superior British squadron impossible.33  He used many of 
the same rationalizations to explain Glasgow's escape.  
 There should be little doubt that Hopkins was correct in his assessment that an 
untrained American squadron would not have been able to successfully engage a British 
squadron of the same size—Hopkins's squadron had a difficult enough time with 
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Glasgow—or that the stores taken from Nassau would have provided great assistance to 
the American military effort.  However, in an example of his provincialism, when 
Hopkins returned to America with the captured stores he gave them not to the 
Continental Army, but to Connecticut and Rhode Island.  Furthermore, the fact that 
Hopkins completely bypassed the Southern coast and did not attempt in any way to 
counter British raiders in the area suggests an additional reason for the raid on Nassau.  
While defending the Southern coast may have helped quell uneasiness about the navy's 
use for New England's benefit, Nassau's capture was sure to attract more public attention 
as a major success for the fledgling Navy.  As such, it had more potential to serve as a 
positive display of Hopkins's aptitude as a fleet commander.      
 Hopkins's fumbling of the engagement with Glasgow, and again against 
Diamond in 1777, along with delays in getting Continental ships to sea, made it apparent 
to the Marine Committee that he was unfit to oversee operations of the navy.  Those 
acquainted with Hopkins and his pride, however, knew that official action would be 
necessary to remove him from his post.  Robert Livingston, the Chancellor of New York, 
wrote concerning the situation, saying that "with respect to Hopkins- you have but one 
way left, appoint an Admiral- but [do not] flatter yourself that even that will bring about 
a resignation….  If you have not the courage … to carry this as the next wise step sell 
your ships to private adventurers…."34 
Although the remaining four captains provide fewer examples of fame, pride, and 
professional advancement as motivating factors, there is nevertheless evidence to 
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suggest it played a part in some of their career decisions.  Barney relished the honor of 
participating in patriotic events, and he took great pleasure in the recognition that 
accompanied them.  Early in the war, he had the "enviable" opportunity to unfurl the 
first Flag of Grand Union in Baltimore, Maryland, while recruiting sailors for Hornet.  
Barney also proudly participated in the events following Maryland's ratification of the 
Constitution in April 1788.  He "commanded" a miniature, fully rigged fifteen-foot ship, 
the Federalist, during the Constitutional parade in Baltimore, and afterwards launched 
the replica into Chesapeake Bay and sailed it to Mount Vernon as a present to George 
Washington.35   
Barney's response to a letter he received on June 5, 1794, informing him that he 
and five others were appointed as the first six captains in the Navy is also indicative of 
his pride.  Listed in order of seniority, Barney found his name listed fourth behind Silas  
Talbot, future captain of Constitution.36  Anticipating Barney's displeasure, Secretary of 
War Henry Knox included a preemptive letter on the 5th which stated, 
Since the nominations to the Senate were made known, it has been said that you 
would not accept the appointment, on the ground that Capt. Talbot was junior in 
rank to you during the late war.  That the reverse of this was the case, will fully 
appear, by the inclosed [sic] resolve of Congress creating Col. Talbot a captain in 
the navy on the 19th of September, 1779….37   
 
The letter went on to lay out Knox's argument for Talbot's seniority, and why he 
deserved the position ahead of Barney.  If the fact that Talbot's name appeared before his 
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was not enough to irritate Barney, Knox's methodical argument which showed that 
Barney was technically only a Lieutenant in the navy would have made him furious.   
Egotism also played a part in Barney's career in the French Navy.  Unbeknownst 
to Barney, the rank capitaine de vaisseau, given to him when he joined the French Navy, 
was divided into three classes of seniority, and the position he accepted was the lowest 
and roughly equivalent to his previous seniority in the Continental Navy.  When Barney 
realized what his new rank truly meant, he quickly resigned his commission and left to 
take personal command of a newly purchased privateer vessel.  Not long after, the 
Minister of Marine in France convinced the Directory to offer Barney a position as 
capitaine de vaisseau du premier, or commodore.  He gladly accepted this higher rank, 
and actively participated in the French service until 1800.   
Wickes also saw opportunities which could advance his own career while at the 
same time furthering the cause of Independence, though his bids for ships and 
promotions were generally more subtle than Jones's or Barney's.  He questioned cruising 
orders sent to him in mid 1777, advising the American Commissioners that not only 
were the recommended areas unfit for proper cruising, but that his ships were too small 
to effect a voyage of any duration.  Instead, he proposed cruises which were more 
profitable to his small squadron and to the cause.38   
American Commissioners also tasked Wickes with inspecting French ships in 
ports he visited, and reporting whether the vessels were fit for purchase as ships of war.  
One frigate in particular, the 36-gun St. John, renamed Comte de Maurepas soon after he 
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inspected it, caught Wickes's eye.  He enthusiastically reported the ship's qualities to the 
Commissioners on January 11, 1777, making sure to mention how quickly the ship could 
be fit for service. Wickes wrote the Commissioners again concerning Maurepas on 
January 18 after he received the frigate's inventory and price, and later described the 
suitability of the vessel for a cruise off the coast of Africa, one of the aforementioned 
operations he proposed mid-1777.  He believed the Guinea coast to be an ideal hunting 
ground for the heavy frigate.39 
 Though not their only motivation, Jones, Hopkins, and Barney displayed desires 
for fame and professional advancement throughout their careers.  Jones sought titles, 
awards, and preferment from men in prominent positions, and consistently lobbied on 
his own behalf for further opportunities for advancement.  Esek Hopkins accepted the 
appointment as the highest ranking officer in the navy, and used the public position to 
gain renown.  Barney's egotism was also well known, and he relished the opportunity to 
involve himself in important, widely reported patriotic events.  Additionally, his pride 
served as the most influential factor behind his refusal to accept a commission in the new 
U.S. Navy in 1794. 
Wickes's subtle petitions for the purchase of Maurepas also suggest a desire for 
promotion, but for the most part Wickes, McNeill, and Barry did not exhibit explicit 
desires for fame or professional advancement.  However, Douglas Adair's conception of 
fame with regards to the Founding Fathers suggests that the very act of seeking a 
commission in the Continental Navy could indicate to some degree a desire for fame.  
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The navy provided an outlet through which each of the six captains could use his talents 
as a navigator and a fighter to gain recognition and status, while at the same time 
furthering the cause of independence.  Rather than reduce the role patriotism played in 
their decisions to join the Continental Navy, their egotism likely enhanced their idealism 
as each captain sought to appeal to the widest audience possible to secure his name in 
history.  For many of the captains, this meant stressing principles of liberty and universal 
rights they likely encountered during their early careers and interactions with the 
Atlantic World.  For McNeill, it meant playing a role in establishing of God's Kingdom 
on Earth. 
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CHAPTER V 
LIBERTY AND FAITH 
 
Many recent works addressing the motivations of important Revolutionary 
statesmen have largely concluded that patriotism served as a veil to hide selfish 
intentions.1  However, dedication to a cause undoubtedly played an important part in the 
six captains’ decisions to serve in the Continental Navy.  Each captain devoted himself 
to the idea of an independent United States, applying the principles of liberty he likely 
encountered during voyages in the West Indies to his home on the continent.  John Paul 
Jones in particular stressed his dedication to ideas of universal rights and freedom that 
played an integral role in the Age of Revolution, and he considered himself a "Citizen of 
the World" as well as an American patriot.2  Furthermore, Hector McNeill characterized 
the Revolution in an overtly religious context, and fought to establish God's Kingdom of 
the Just.   
While Patriotism literally means devotion to one's country, it is described in 
numerous ways by authors throughout history, and in more popular usage is mired in 
connotation.  Therefore, it is useful to consider Douglas Adair's conception of the 
patriotism displayed by the Founding Fathers as a comparison point for discussing each 
                                                 
1
 For examples of recent works that address the motivations of Revolutionary statesmen and Constitutional 
debates, see Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of 
the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s 
Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009).  For civil-military 
relations involving the Continental Army, and motivations for service in the Continental Army, see the 
aforementioned Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War. 
2
 Jones to Jacques Le Ray de Chaumont, 14 September 1778, in JP, 406. 
77 
 
captain's personal dedication.  Adair argues that the Founding Fathers were transformed 
by the American Revolution in the process of making it, and that their conception of 
honor in conjunction with a lust for glory and the reward of fame became key 
ingredients in their personal development after 1776.  Because patriotism is neither 
ethically blind nor morally neutral, those characteristics of self-interest and ambition 
were transformed into efforts for the community, but still provided the occupational 
specialization and social position necessary for the honor and fame sought after by the 
Founders.3  Importantly, their patriotic sentiments were genuine, and the existence of 
additional motivations does not diminish the sincerity of their dedication. 
Just as service in the Continental Navy is in itself a potential indicator for a 
degree of egotistical motivation, it is also suggestive of where one's dedication to liberty 
or faith stood in relation to other motives.  Specifically, Lambert Wickes's and McNeill's 
continued service in the navy implies that financial considerations were inferior to 
patriotic or religious impetus.  Even though John Barry sailed in privateer ships for part 
of the war, his efforts to remain in the navy, sometimes in frustrating positions, suggest 
patriotism served as a motivating factor for him as well.  With respect to John Paul Jones 
and Esek Hopkins, while it is possible their naval service only represented a desire for 
renown and professional advancement, or that financial concerns rivaled their dedication 
to the United States, their correspondence and opinions on privateering suggest that 
financial gain was not a strong motive for either of them.     
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The advantages and drawbacks to privateering were heavily debated by 
contemporary Revolutionaries.  As previously mentioned, privateering remained a 
popular choice of employment during the war, and Congress alone licensed at least 
1,700 privateer ships during the war. The practice had its supporters, among them John 
Adams and Benjamin Franklin, who believed privateers had much to offer the war effort 
by way of redirecting private interest into service for the public good.  However, most 
men connected to the Continental Navy developed contempt, and in some cases outright 
loathing, for privateer vessels.  For his part, William Vernon, the President of the 
Eastern Naval Board, prayed for an embargo against all private ships, as privateers had 
proven "fatal" to outfitting and manning Continental ships.4  
Many Continental captains were also critical of privateers, the most outspoken of 
whom was Jones.  He believed privateer owners and the men they employed were 
"actuated by no nobler principle than that of self interest," and were devoid of all "public 
virtue."5  In addition to their lack of character, Jones identified the negative impact 
privateers had on the navy.  Meeting with countless manning difficulties early in his 
career, Jones took matters into his own hands to fill his complement on November 1, 
1776.  Finding the privateer Eagle at anchor, Jones had the ship searched; he recovered 
four deserters, and impressed roughly twenty additional men.  The event demonstrated 
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Jones's disdain for privateers, and his opinion that the good of the cause required 
sacrifice from private service.  He took pride in "being the first who hath broken thro' the 
shameful Abuses which have too long been practiced upon the Navy by 
Mercenaries…."6  
 Although he commanded multiple private vessels throughout the war, patriotism 
also served as a motivation for Joshua Barney.  The potentially lucrative employment as 
a privateer did not interest Barney when he signed with Captain William Stone on 
Hornet.  Barney's patriotism is also reflected in his reaction to the two instances of 
cowardice by other officers he witnessed.  The first involved the aforementioned 
situation involving Captain Stone.  The second event, which resulted in Barney's 
imprisonment by the British, also saw him breach the rules of subordination.  
During the night of March 31, 1778, the frigate Virginia ran aground in its 
attempt to put to sea.  Rather than fight, Captain James Nicholson quickly abandoned the 
frigate without securing his signals or papers.7  When Nicholson returned to his captured 
ship under a flag of truce to retrieve personal belongings which were left on board in his 
haste to escape, Barney released a tirade upon Nicholson in front of his captors.8 Only in 
these two instances of cowardice that flew in the face of patriotism and duty did Barney 
violate the etiquette of naval hierarchy.          
Barney's postwar service also suggests a degree of patriotism in his motivations.  
Although he refused a commission as a captain in the U.S. Navy, Barney volunteered his 
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service to President Jefferson after the Chesapeake Affair in 1807.  In a letter dated July 
4, 1807, Barney stated his belief that in a time of crisis "every citizen [should] step 
forward in support of his country."  Receiving no reply from Jefferson, Barney sent a 
further inquiry to his acquaintance and newly elected President, James Madison, on 
March 12, 1809, which stated "I shall always feel a sincere pleasure in contributing my 
feeble abilities in any manner you please for the good of our country."9 
John Barry also served as both a privateer and as a Continental captain during the 
war, but patriotism and personal prestige were more important motivational factors than 
money.  He made efforts to remain engaged by the Continental Navy, and in cases when 
finances necessitated that he find employment in private service Barry obtained a leave 
of absence from the Marine Committee.10  While the construction and fitting of ships 
required a responsible man with relevant expertise, being stuck on shore was an 
experience no fighting captain would wish to endure.  Yet that is the situation in which 
Barry found himself at the beginning of the war: he gave up his command, the Black 
Prince, after its purchase by Congress, and helped convert it for use by another captain 
before overseeing the outfitting of other ships he knew he would not command.  The job 
was certainly against Barry's nature as a fighting captain, and one he likely viewed as 
being beneath his abilities.  That Barry accepted such a status in the navy rather than 
take command of a privateer vessel implies that Barry's patriotism, along with a degree 
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of egotism and the promise of a regular salary, overrode any desire to accumulate 
wealth.  
Similarly, there is very little concrete evidence to suggest that motivations other 
than patriotism and regular pay significantly influenced Lambert Wickes.  It is clear 
Wickes had a personal conception of honor—particularly professional honor—but there 
is no indication he saw his identity linked to social stratification.  Unlike John Paul Jones 
who constantly lobbied for position and vehemently protested his rank, Wickes seemed 
content with his position of eleven out of twenty-four captains.  Though 
characteristically modest in most of his correspondence, Wickes's response to 
accusations of prisoner mistreatment shows he could protest effectively if a situation 
provoked him.  Not only are there no complaints about his rank in any of his existing 
writings, but there is a complete absence on discussions of rank in general, or of his 
position in relation to other captains.   
There is also no indication that Wickes sought public recognition or fame for his 
actions.  Much like Barry, his after-action reports were extraordinarily modest and 
straightforward, and mentioned the exemplary conduct of others far more often than his 
own actions.  None of his surviving letters express a desire for commendations or 
honors, detail his qualifications based on previous actions, or appear to be an attempt to 
ingratiate himself to those in superior position.  Wickes, it seems, ignored service rivalry 
and simply wished to serve the cause in any way that he could.  
It must be admitted that there is a paucity of information concerning  Wickes's 
life prior to the war.  It is probable that the onset of the conflict threatened his livelihood 
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as a merchant ship owner, possibly prompting him to seek alternative employment.  The 
want for employment, however, is not in itself contradictory to patriotism or to Wickes's 
understanding of professional duty, and there were certainly other opportunities for work 
available during wartime.  A case could also be made that Wickes joined the Continental 
Navy because a vessel and captaincy were promised to him by acquaintance Robert 
Morris, and that the assurance of respectable rank and pay, in addition to serving in an 
official capacity, was the reasonable and socially conscious career choice of a man from 
a family with deep roots in the community.11   
Although demonstrating an allegiance to the United States, other captains also 
dedicated themselves to additional principles.  For Jones, liberty took a universal form; 
he fought not solely for American independence, but for common rights and liberty.  He 
"stepped forth as a free Citizen of the World in defence of the Violated rights of 
Mankind," sacrificing financially and personally "To Support the Cause of Human 
Nature."12  Jones painstakingly dedicated himself to that 'Glorious Cause" which he 
believed Congress had "vested [him] with a Publick [sic] Character" to serve.13    
 Hector McNeill also fought for more widespread, universal principles, though in 
a vastly different context from Jones's Enlightenment ideals.  While all of the captains 
identified themselves with a religion, McNeill's references to religion and his overtly 
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religious conception of the American Revolution were unique among Continental 
captains.  The religiousness of McNeill's family, or at what age his own faith solidified 
is unknown, but by the time he started writing his autobiography in 1773 McNeill 
believed in the "Goodness of God Manifested … in many verey [sic] pressing dangers."  
He implored future generations of his family to have faith in "theire dependance [sic] on 
[God]."14      
McNeill's religious character is also evident in many of the letters he wrote 
during the Revolution.  At the most basic level, his religiosity revealed itself in the way 
he concluded some of his correspondence with prayers for his friends.  Finishing a letter 
to Thomas Thompson, he wrote "may God bless and prosper you is the Prayer of your 
Friend," and to John Adams he hoped for "God [to] strengthen your hearts in this day of 
trial, and save our country by his Almighty power."15  He often wrote similar endings to 
his family, and to his friend Captain John Paul Jones, stating "May God preserve you," 
and offering his blessings and continued affections.16  
While such statements are in themselves distinctive compared to other captains, 
religion's role in McNeill's life did not confine itself to formalities and the conclusions of 
letters.  Indeed, religious conviction affected his entire outlook on the war.  He prayed 
for "God [to] prosper our honest endeavours [sic] to establish the general rights of 
Mankind, and convince the world that we are worthy of Freedome…."  Although similar 
to sentiments expressed by other captains regarding universal rights, McNeill fought for 
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 Autobiographical Sketch, 1773, in Gardner W. Allen, Hector McNeill, 11, 15-17.  The indicated pages 
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 McNeill to Captain Thomas Thompson, 21 July 1777, in NDAR, 9: 304-05; McNeill to John Adams, 9 
October 1777, in Allen, Hector McNeill, 85. 
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a religious conception of liberty: for the creation of a "Kingdom of the just."17  In doing 
so he participated in the continuation of John Winthrop's ideas of American 
exceptionalism, and the expansion of the Puritan ideal of a "city upon a hill."   
Other noteworthy voices in Revolutionary America also conceived of the war as 
the establishment of God's Kingdom on Earth.  Writing in 1779, John Adams similarly 
identified the American cause as a "virtuous Vision of a Kingdom of the just."18  Both 
men also recognized dangers presented to the cause by human factors.  Having presented 
his argument to the Marine Committee that John Manley's conduct caused the loss of 
Fox, McNeill wrote "May God Strengthen the Hands of the Congress & Save our 
Country by his Mighty Power, join'd with their honest Endeavours [sic] " in the absence 
of ability in many of the men Congress employed.19  More concerned with moral 
corruption than lack of ability, Adams wrote that if "selfishness, Vanity, flattery, and 
Corruption" continued to fester within his American countrymen that the cause would 
"not be worth the while of Men of Virtue."20 
 McNeill conceived of the Revolution in more complicated terms than the 
dichotomy of good versus evil, or tyranny versus freedom.  In early 1777, McNeill 
beseeched God to "Grant us that happiness when all our Contests with unatural [sic] 
foes are honourably decided."21  Given the shared religious and cultural backgrounds of 
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the colonies with Britain, it is likely that "unatural foes" referred to the British.22  
Although he considered Britain an unnatural enemy, one he had served under previously, 
McNeill's "Superior Atachment [sic] to this country [withdrew] me from that service."23     
Whether they were more influenced by principles of universal rights, or solely by 
independence for America, Adair's assessment of the Founding Fathers' patriotism is 
probably also applicable to a number of Continental captains.  Jones displayed patriotic 
fervor that at the very least matched his ego, and while less vociferous about his 
dedication, patriotism probably also played a part in Hopkins's decision to join the 
Continental Navy.  Given Barney's reason for rejecting service in the United States 
Navy, and his reasons for joining the French Navy, it is also likely that Adair's argument 
applies to him as the Continental Navy harnessed his pride for the public good.24   
The three remaining captains, John Barry, Lambert Wickes and Hector McNeill, 
are more difficult to place within Adair's construction of fame and patriotism.  Apart 
from the act of joining the Continental navy, and in Barry's case his efforts to remain in 
the navy, none of them displayed a vehement desire to acquire position or renown; 
indeed, issues of rank are absent from their writings.  If his modest prose is indicative of 
the man, it would seem that Wickes's decision to serve in the Continental Navy was 
primarily driven by dedication to his country, and perhaps his familial background and 
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the promise of steady pay.  Regarding McNeill, religion heavily influenced his 
motivation to serve in the war; attached to principles of the rights of mankind, he fought 
to help establish a "Kingdom of the just." 
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CHAPTER VI 
FOR WANT OF MONEY 
 
 In contrast to privateering, service in the Continental Navy provided few 
opportunities for significant financial gain.  Salaries of naval officers compared 
unfavorably with those of their counterparts in the army, and their pay increasingly fell 
short of a livable income as the war progressed and inflation eroded the purchasing 
power of the money they received—when they received it, because their salaries often 
remained unpaid.  The potential for prizes was a small consolation to many Continental 
officers, as long periods of inactivity on shore due to lack of ships or manpower 
restricted chances for prize money.  Even when sailors were fortunate enough to capture 
a British ship, the Congressional prize money system did nothing to promote service in 
the navy over private employ as privateersmen received a larger portion of the value of 
prizes sold than did mariners in Continental service.  Once condemned and sold, prize 
money was collected by prize agents who were sometimes lazy or corrupt, and did 
everything they could to delay transferring the money they received to the crewmen 
entitled to a portion of it.  The government's financial difficulties forced many captains 
to advance crews pay out of their own pockets, and to refit their ships with the 
understanding that Congress would eventually reimburse them.  While financial gain in 
addition to the potential for a steady paycheck was therefore not a motivation for initial 
service, financial stability nevertheless played an important role in influencing the career 
arcs of each captain.  Joshua Barney and John Barry left the navy multiple times out of 
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financial necessity, and the other captains all experienced difficulties fitting and 
manning ships for lack of funds. 
 The Continental Navy's pay scale, established November 28, 1775, was wholly 
inadequate for a seagoing force that consisted of many more officers than it had 
positions to fill.  Captains were salaried at thirty-two dollars a month, and lieutenants 
and masters at twenty dollars a month.1  In comparison, the salary in the Continental 
Army for a colonel—the rank equivalent to a naval captain—was seventy dollars, over 
twice that paid a navy captain, and captains in the army earned forty dollars per month, 
i.e., more than a naval captain and twice that of a lieutenant—his equivalent in the naval 
service.2  Although officers and men in the navy received a salary increase in November 
1776, their pay remained well below salaries in the army.3  Weary of the inadequacy of 
their pay and the disparity between navy and army compensation, a group of lieutenants 
in the navy petitioned the Marine Committee in May 1777, asking that their monthly 
income be equal to those of an army captain, "it being Impossible for us to Support 
Ourselves & Families much More to lay in the Smallest Stores for Sea."4  Though they 
received better pay, army officers also complained about their inability to live on their 
income, a problem which George Washington recognized in 1778 when he implored 
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 In contrast, common seamen received just over six dollars per month in salary.  Rules and Regulations of 
the Navy of the United Colonies, 28 November 1775, in NDAR, 2: 1174-82.  
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Congress to give officers and enlisted men in the Continental Army "adequate 
compensation" for their sacrifices.5   
 The lack of funds to pay wages and prize money compounded the situation, and 
sailors sometimes had to wait years to receive payment for their service.  Writing in 
November 1778, John Paul Jones reminded Edward Bancroft he had "received neither 
Pay nor Rations from [America] since the date of my first Commission the 7th day of 
Decr. 1775…."6  Such extreme shortages led Continental agents to implore Congress to 
furnish them with additional money.  Nathanial Shaw, Jr., a New London merchant and 
Continental agent for Connecticut, wrote the Marine Committee in late 1777 and early 
1778 to request "Twenty Thousand Pounds Lawfull [sic] Money" to cover ship 
provisions, wages, and advances of personal money he had made.7  John Langdon, who 
superintended construction of Continental warships in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 
found himself in a similar situation, and wrote to the president of Congress that "the 
Marine Board at Boston are doing every thing [sic] in their Power to Supply me," but 
that he still required "a supply of Money to pay off" large sums owed to a number of 
people.  The accounts must be settled, he added, even if "I am obliged to Sell my own 
Estate for the purpose."8   
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 Washington to the Committee of Congress With the Army, 28 January 1778, in John C. Fitzpatrick and 
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Continental captains were also "loud in their complaints" concerning wages and 
prize money due themselves and their crews.9  Jones often petitioned on his crew's 
behalf, and advanced money of his own to fit ships he commanded and to pay his men.  
The shortage of Continental currency followed Jones to France, and he continued to 
support himself and his men, incurring personal debt in the absence of his salary for 
which he later sought and received compensation.10  Jones also spent time in Europe 
after the war pursuing prize money owed by France and Denmark, and in 1786 he finally 
received 167,483 livres from the French government for himself and the crews of Bon 
Homme Richard and Alliance. Jones informed John Jay of his success, and reminded the 
statesman of the "allowance that ought in Justice to be made for the great expence [sic], 
trouble, and time I have dedicated to this business" from the end of 1783.11    
Though not as eager as Jones in his efforts to help crewmembers, lack of funds 
also prompted Hector McNeill to send requests on their behalf.  Following the loss of 
Fox, McNeill requested wages for his crew—he did not mention his own pay—and 
questioned how families of deceased sailors could collect compensation.12  Like Jones, 
he also experienced a "want of cash," and advanced personal money to outfit his own 
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ship; October of 1777 found McNeill "more than three thousand dollars in advance, and 
all this without fee or reward."13             
Even as he supported efforts which might have resulted in prizes and an increase 
in his personal wealth, Lambert Wickes's letters made very few references to his 
finances.  When he did mention money, it usually related to the disposal of prizes in 
neutral ports.  Initial letters explained his clandestine method of selling prizes through 
local French merchants who would register and rename the captured ship, and then sell 
its cargo.  Later missives also describe the sale of prizes, but detail the increasingly 
difficult time Wickes had disposing of his captures under the watchful eye of British 
agents, and the mounting political pressure on French officials by Lord Stormont.  
Wickes only lobbied the Commissioners once for money, and he did so in order to 
appease a mutinous crew who had served their one year contracts and wanted payment.14 
Although financial circumstances affected all Continental captains throughout 
their careers, it played a more direct role in John Barry's and Joshua Barney's 
Continental service.  Financial forced Barry to seek employment in private service.  
After losing Raleigh to the British, Barry returned to Philadelphia "At a very Grate 
Expence [sic] " in October 1778, with no foreseeable prospects for command of another 
Continental ship.  Living off of previous earnings, Barry jumped at the opportunity to 
command the privateer Delaware in early 1779.15  Although the position proved 
lucrative, resulting in one prize and two successful trading voyages to the West Indies, 
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Barry returned to the Continental Navy in November when Congress offered him 
command of the 74-gun America, then under construction in Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire.16  This prospect for command fell through, however, and Barry's obligation 
to care for his own family, and for the widow and daughter of his recently-deceased 
brother, prompted him to obtain another leave from public service.  Command of a 
privately owned vessel again presented an opportunity to "[retrieve] hiss [sic]loss 
sustained in the Public Service," and Barry completed one voyage on the brig America 
before he accepted command of the Continental Navy frigate Alliance.17 
An unfortunate relationship with money characterized Barney's service more so 
than any of the other five captains' careers.  Unlike Jones, Barney did not ardently detest 
privateers, but his initial employment in the Continental Navy and his multiple returns to 
public service show Barney still preferred Continental ships to private enterprise.  Even 
so, the Continental Navy's lack of vessels in 1778 prompted Barney to accept a spot as 
first lieutenant on the privateer ship General Mercer.  He assisted in the capture of the 
British privateer Minerva, and, after sailing the prize ship into Philadelphia, he left for 
Baltimore and sought another appointment on a Continental ship.  Money continued to 
be a concern for Barney after accepting a position on Saratoga, and he petitioned 
Congress to ensure his pay as first lieutenant on board an 18-gun ship would still match 
the compensation he received for serving on larger vessels.18  
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Barney's voyage on Saratoga resulted in his capture by the British in early 
October 1780, and confinement on board British prison ships until his transfer to Old 
Mill Prison in Plymouth, England.  Escaping on May 18, 1781, Barney arrived back in 
Philadelphia in March 1782, to grim prospects for work in the Continental Navy; 22 
captains and 39 lieutenants were also unassigned.19  Financial obligations to his family 
necessitated Barney's employment, but instead of again looking for privateer work he 
accepted a captain's commission in the Pennsylvania State Navy, a promotion over his 
previous Continental rank of lieutenant, and received his first independent command, the 
Hyder-Ally. 
The years following the American Revolution were also fraught with financial 
misfortune for Barney.  He entered into a business partnership with his brother-in-law in 
1784, but multiple unexpected and unfortunate situations led the business to fail just a 
year later.  An importation business Barney invested in afterwards nearly bankrupted 
him, and although the auction business he entered into with John Hollins in 1790 did 
achieve some financial success, it was not enough for Barney to support his family.20   
Those misfortunes led him to purchase the 300-ton Sampson in 1792 to trade with Saint 
Domingue in the Caribbean, but that enterprise ended when a British warship seized the 
Sampson for violating a British ban on trade with France or its possessions.  Combined 
with the French consul general's refusal to honor Barney's debtor note for $30,000, the 
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Sampson's seizure sealed his return to the brink of destitution just prior to accepting his 
commission in the French Navy. 
 Although the initial promise of a steady salary served as an incentive to join the 
Continental Navy, financial gain was not a significant motivating factor.  All of the 
captains except Jones entered the war with some degree of financial stability from their 
prewar activities.  All survived for extended periods without pay, and many possessed 
good enough credit to borrow money they used to help fit out the ships they commanded 
and to advance wages to men serving on board the vessels.  The very act of seeking a 
commission in the Continental Navy shows financial gain did not play a significant role 
in their choice of employment.  Privateering and merchant service presented 
opportunities of larger profits for a skilled captain, and more reliable payment after 1778 
for services rendered.  Even so, the captains all preferred public service to private 
enterprise, and Barry and Barney always returned to the navy when finances permitted.  
Jones's declaration that he was not an "Adventurer of Fortune" was representative of the 
other captains as well.21 
 Financial stability did, however, have the potential to affect a captain's conduct 
and career arc after accepting employment in the navy.  Most notably, the navy's lack of 
ships and unreliable and inadequate pay forced Barney and Barry to seek positions in 
other seagoing services.  Barney's financial situation remained particularly precarious 
after the war and influenced his decision to serve in the French Navy, and in private 
service at the outset of the War of 1812.  As described in chapter three, financial concern 
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probably also influenced Barney's decision to disobey orders and engage the General 
Washington in 1782.  Confronted with an erratic wage and prize money system, loyalty 
to their crews led McNeill and Wickes to petition on their behalf for compensation, and 
Jones also went to great lengths during and after the Revolution to ensure he and his men 
received prize money.  Although not necessarily in personal distress, each captain 
experienced difficulties throughout his career due to the navy's lack of ships and 
financial instability
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
  
 Service in the Continental Navy was not a foregone conclusion for American 
seafarers who supported independence.  Indeed, while some chose to serve the United 
States in an official capacity, a larger number entered private service to fight the British 
and make their fortunes as privateersmen.  As the war progressed, the navy became 
increasingly hard pressed for ships and sailors, and for money to pay the salaries and 
wages of its officers and enlisted men.  Still, some men chose public service over the 
potentially more-lucrative private enterprise presented by privateers, and the reasons 
why are important to understanding the men who formed the foundations of the 
American Revolution and the Continental Navy.   
The early careers of the six captains presented in this study primed them for 
seagoing service during America’s War for Independence.  Employment on merchant 
vessels provided the professional training required to navigate and direct the operations 
of a sailing ship, and each captain learned his trade well enough to command a merchant 
ship before the war.  Hector McNeill and Esek Hopkins also claimed previous military 
experience that helped them to secure their initial positions in the navy, as both had seen 
combat during the French and Indian War and served on land at the outset of the 
Revolution.   
Although previous shipboard experience may have helped the captains secure 
their initial positions in the navy, higher rank and seniority required social connections.  
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New England provincialism dominated the Continental Marine Committee which issued 
commissions and established the list of seniority, and all of the first appointed captains 
except Nicholas Biddle were New Englanders.  Esek Hopkins undoubtedly benefited 
from his brother's position as a leading member of the Marine Committee when he was 
appointed commander-in-chief of the first Continental squadron, and Hector McNeill's 
association with John Hancock and Thomas Cushing probably also influenced his 
placement at third on the October 10, 1776, seniority list for captains.  Two officers with 
links to the Middle Colonies also did well in the seniority listing; John Barry, ranked 
seventh, and Lambert Wickes,  ranked eleventh, both knew Robert Morris who may 
have induced them to seek employment in the navy.  Much to his chagrin, Congress 
placed Jones, whose links were to Virginia and North Carolina, at eighteenth out of 
twenty-four.   
But why serve in the Continental Navy in the first place?  For Lambert Wickes 
and Hopkins, their family backgrounds may have provided some impetus to seek 
government employ.  Hopkins came from a family with a history of public service, and 
his brother already served as a Rhode Island delegate to the Continental Congress, and as 
a member of the Marine Committee.  The pursuit of a "gentlemanly" profession may 
have been expected of him.  While little is known about Wickes before the war, his 
family had deep roots in Maryland as one of the earliest families on the Eastern Shore.  
A desire to contribute to his family's legacy in America may have also prompted him to 
seek a commission in the navy. 
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The captains' experiences in the West Indies trade also put them into contact with 
an "Atlantic World" which may have affected their understandings of duty, and helped 
them develop more universal ideas of liberty and resistance to authority.  Because of 
their social, cultural, and economic disconnect from Britain, the captains would have 
applied those newfound principles to their homes in the North American colonies, and 
helped form an attachment to the idea of an independent United States.  Although 
provincialism played a role in the formation of the Continental Navy, much like Charles 
Royster argues localism influenced participation in the army, the navy's development 
also occurred within an Atlantic World context, involving men whose early lives and 
careers were spent interacting with a diverse and expansive network of people and ideas. 
A basic need for employment—not to be confused with a desire for financial 
gain—may have also played a part in the decision for some captains to serve.  John Paul 
Jones in particular required a steady form of income after he departed Tobago in haste 
without settling his accounts.  Though little is known about his movements between his 
departure from Tobago and when he received his lieutenant's commission in the 
Continental Navy, it is possible he remained unemployed through 1774 and most of 
1775.  The promise of a reliable income, though later found to be extraordinarily 
undependable, may have presented an attractive employment option.  
 On a more personal level, and intertwined with Hopkins's and Wickes's possible 
familial motivations, this study suggests that all six Continental captains were primarily 
motivated to join the navy by a desire for renown, and by a sense of patriotism.  Because 
of the lack of materials relating to each captain prior to the war, it has used their conduct 
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during their varied careers to demonstrate each captain's dedication to the United States, 
and the pursuit of fame that underlay their service.  Although each captain sometimes 
provided straightforward examples of their dedication and their ego, the majority of their 
writings did not explicitly elucidate their motivations.  However, by comparing their 
actions to the understandings of duty that influenced their behavior in the navy, 
including instances where captains disobeyed orders, came into conflict with superiors, 
and their relationships with crews, the motivations of fame and patriotism are more 
clearly revealed.  This method of inquiry also suggests that while financial gain was not 
an impetus for serving in the Continental Navy, the potential for a steady salary did 
promote initial service, and financial stability became an influential factor in each 
captain's career during the war.  
 Pursuing a commission in the Continental Navy is in itself indicative of some 
degree of egotistical motivation and suggests patriotism and ego were more influential 
factors than financial gain.  While the navy could not compete with privateers in 
profitability, it provided more incentives in terms of prestige.  Commanders of 
Continental vessels were more likely to have their exploits publicized than if they were 
one of the hundreds of American privateers, and public service put captains in contact 
with leading statesmen and other important figures in society.  
Douglas Adair’s assessment of  “Fame and the Founding Fathers” is also 
applicable to the six Continental captains.  The Continental Navy served as an outlet for 
each man’s abilities, and bent their egotistical motivations into service for the public 
good while giving them the opportunity to pursue renown.  Rather than overshadow their 
100 
 
patriotism, their desire for fame bolstered their dedication and enthusiasm for the 
American cause as the captains tried to appeal to the widest possible audience.   
 To varying degrees, events in each captain’s career reflected his motivations for 
service.  Although Esek Hopkins offered to serve the United States without pay and 
exerted a great amount of effort in behalf of the rebelling colonies, his actions during the 
war suggest a desire for renown accompanied his patriotism.  Hopkins chose to disobey 
explicit orders from Congress to protect the Southern coast, and ordered his squadron 
directly to the Bahamas.  While the raid had practical applications, it also represented a 
better chance for Hopkins to make a name for himself and demonstrate his abilities as a 
fleet commander.  When Congress censured him for his actions, Hopkins's ego led him 
to openly criticize congressmen as corrupt know-nothings.  His insubordination, 
combined with his ineptitude as a squadron commander and the navy's financial 
difficulties that forced most of the Continental squadron to remain inactive, resulted in 
Hopkins's dismissal. 
  Although unsuccessful in accomplishing his goal of achieving additional 
prestige that motivated Hopkins to serve in the navy, his service does not seem to have 
negatively affected his post-navy career.  Despite his failure as commander-in-chief of 
the Continental Navy's first squadron, he enjoyed success in public office after his 
dismissal, serving on the General Assembly in Rhode Island from 1777-1786, and on the 
state council of war.  Hopkins's local contacts made during his prewar career, his 
family's position in public affairs, and his initial role as commander of Rhode Island's 
101 
 
military forces during the Revolution undoubtedly aided his ability to recover from his 
dismal career in the navy.   
 Perhaps the most ardent patriot of the six captains, John Paul Jones often 
declared he fought as a "Citizen of the World" to support the cause of universal liberty 
and an independent United States.  His desire for fame rivaled his dedication and 
enthusiasm for the cause of liberty, and Jones coveted rank, titles, and awards that 
accompanied great patriotic deeds.  He ingratiated himself to others in letters and action 
reports in his quest for favor from men and women in high places, and was as quick to 
recognize praise as to identify slights against his honor.  Although Jones went to great 
lengths to care for American sailors, including petitioning on their behalf for prize 
money and wages, and encouraging prisoner exchanges that could alleviate the condition 
of Americans held captive by the British, his passions sometimes overcame him and 
resulted in the mistreat of his crews and officers.   
Jones's wartime contacts and experience indisputably helped him after the 
Revolution.  He successfully acquired prize money owed to him and his crews by the 
French, and accepted a position in the Russian Navy in 1788 offered to him as a result of 
his performance during the Revolution.  Although he died alone in Paris in 1792, 
possibly feeling abandoned and questioning his legacy, history has proven Jones 
successful in acquiring the prestige that influenced his decision to seek a commission in 
the Continental Navy. 
 Joshua Barney also took great pride in participating in patriotic events, but 
financial troubles throughout the war caused by the navy's lack of ships forced him to 
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seek employment outside of the Continental Navy on multiple occasions.  He served as a 
privateer at one point during the war, and in the Pennsylvania State Navy following his 
escape from Old Mill Prison, but Barney always returned to the Continental Navy when 
his finances allowed.  Money troubles and a want of rank and renown also influenced 
Barney's later decision to join the French Navy, and to then quit and rejoin over an issue 
of rank.  Barney returned to American service as a privateer during the War of 1812, and 
accepted a captain's commission in the United States Navy in 1814. 
 Barney owed much of his success in negotiating multiple changes of employment 
to the contacts he made during the war, and to his travels around the Caribbean.  He 
secured a position as first lieutenant on General Mercer because of his previous service 
with the ship's commander, Isaiah Robinson, and his prior naval experience probably 
helped him acquire command of Hyder-Ally.  Barney's West Indian and French contacts 
also helped him after the war, first in establishing trade relationships in Saint Domingue, 
and then receiving a commission in the French Navy and operating in the Caribbean.  
Although his foreign service negatively affected his bids for political office, personal 
contacts and his naval experience netted Barney a captain's commission in the U.S. Navy 
during the War of 1812.  
 Like Barney, financial setbacks also caused John Barry to enter private service at 
two points during the war, though he preferred employment in the Continental Navy.  
Barry had a growing family to support, and languishing on shore without a command 
was never an option for long.  When new opportunities to serve in the navy presented 
themselves, however, Barry always returned to public service.  Though Barry's action 
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reports were usually straightforward and succinct and he did not try to promote himself 
in letters, his ego showed through during confrontations with Francis Hopkinson.  Barry 
saw the order to scuttle Effingham as an affront on Hopkinson's part, and the relationship 
between the two men only worsened during the debacle involving the actual sinking.  
 Barry's ability to maintain employment during the war was largely due to his 
successful utilization of professional contacts.  Positions on privateer vessels came as a 
result of his acquaintances and reputation, and his initial employment in the Continental 
Navy stemmed from his West Indian experience and the fact that he had previously 
commanded Black Prince, which he helped convert into the warship Alfred.  Barry's 
wartime contacts also helped him maintain employment after the war, and he took 
command of the Asia to participate in the China trade, and later commanded the frigate 
United States as the most-senior captain in the new U.S. Navy.  Unofficially labeled the 
"Father of the United States Navy" by many subsequent writers, Barry undoubtedly 
accomplished the ambitions that motivated him to serve in the Continental Navy.  
 Although McNeill's patriotism and desire for renown probably mirrored that of 
the other captains, his dedication to the United States included a unique religious 
element.  A devout Protestant, McNeill characterized the Revolution as a war to 
establish a "Kingdom of the Just," and he continued his work as a privateer out of 
Boston after his dismissal from the Continental Navy.  Though he may have considered 
his religious mission a success, McNeill failed in his pursuit of fame and professional 
advancement during his career in the navy, and his merchant activities following the 
Revolution made little money.  Whether he failed to utilize his contacts in Boston and 
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the government successfully after the war, or if they abandoned him after Hancock's loss 
is unknown, but McNeill's death in 1785 left his family in destitution.  
 Finally, Lambert Wickes showed little personal motivation outside of his 
dedication to the United States.  He strictly followed notions of professional duty, and 
his correspondence was extraordinarily humble and straightforward.  Wickes seemed 
content with his place at eleventh on the captain's list of 1776, though his subtle bids for 
command of Maurepas suggest he harbored at least some impulse for professional 
advancement.  Had he lived through the war, Wickes's continued outstanding service 
may have helped him achieve professional and public recognition on the level of Jones 
or Barry.    
 The outbreak of the Revolution presented American seafarers with choices: 
Whether to opt for neutrality, join the rebels, or to remain loyal to Great Britain.  For 
those who decided to support the American quest for independence, the next question 
was how should one serve: in the merchant marine, as a privateer, or in the new 
Continental Navy.  Patriotism and a desire for renown motivated Esek Hopkins, John 
Paul Jones, Joshua Barney, John Barry, Hector McNeill, and Lambert Wickes to seek 
commissions in the Continental Navy, and influenced their conduct while in the service.  
Financial considerations during the war further affected their conduct and career arcs, 
but the pursuit of wealth did not serve as any of the men's primary impetus for service.  
Never at work alone, there was a constant balancing act at play among the motivational 
factors within each captain, and each motivation's degree of influence was largely 
situational.  By further analyzing and exploring motivations for service in the 
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Continental Navy, historians stand to better understand the personal motivations  and 
Atlantic World context behind the ideological origins of the American Revolution, and 
the military forces that fought to win independence for a new nation.  
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